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LEARNING FROM CAMPAIGN FINANCE INFORMATION
Abby K. Wood*
ABSTRACT
In an age of dark money—the anonymous political spending facilitated by
gaps in our campaign finance disclosure laws after Citizens United—the
Supreme Court’s campaign finance disclosure jurisprudence may be on a
collision course with campaign finance disclosure laws. It is urgent for the Court
to understand the informational benefits of campaign finance disclosure, so it
may avoid this collision.
Campaign finance transparency teaches us more than one-dimensional
information about the candidate’s left- or right-leaning policy preferences. It
also helps us learn about candidate type. Social scientists, including myself,
have run several studies examining voter learning from campaign finance
information. As I explain in this Article, when voters learn about a candidate’s
position with regard to dark money, they learn and vote differently than if they
did not have that information. Experimental and observational research also
suggests that voters punish noncompliance and reward overcompliance. In
other words, transparency about campaign finance disclosure and compliance
informs voters.
These findings point to useful policy innovations for states and cities, while
the federal government is unable or unwilling to regulate. The innovations I
propose include “disclosure disclaimers,” which inform voters about the
presence of dark money in a campaign, and campaign finance audits, which
inform voters about compliance with campaign finance laws. But more basic
loophole-closing can also provide helpful information to voters. I explain
implications for the courts, campaigns, and policymakers, as well as limitations
on the argument.
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INTRODUCTION
Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman were arrested at Reagan National Airport with
one-way tickets to Vienna and indicted for campaign finance violations.1 Among
other charges, they are alleged to have funneled over $300,000 in foreign money
through a limited liability corporation (LLC) into political campaigns, including
former President Trump’s “official” SuperPAC.2 The SuperPAC is required to
disclose its donors, but the LLC is not, so the public’s ability to “follow the
money” ends with the LLC’s name and not the foreign sources of the money
behind the LLC.3 The public is kept in the dark.
Dark money, or anonymous spending in our political campaigns, has
accounted for at least $1 billion since Citizens United, a sum that greatly
undercounts the actual amount of dark spending because dark money groups
have also run thousands of issue ads over that time period.4 Expanded disclosure
requirements can reduce the amount of undisclosed money in our elections. At
the federal level, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) passed an anemic
disclosure regulation, and the Senate has blocked other regulatory efforts to shed
more light on the money in American politics.5
Some states have passed laws demanding more transparency in our elections,
but the Supreme Court’s disclosure jurisprudence may be on a collision course
with these laws. Part of the reason for the pending collision is the Court’s limited
understanding of the informational benefits of campaign finance disclosure. It is
therefore urgent to help the Court right-size its understanding of what we learn
from campaign finance disclosures.
The Supreme Court has upheld disclosure regulations that support a
combination of governmental interests, namely combatting corruption or its
appearance, informing the electorate, and enabling enforcement.6 However, its
1
See Mark Mazzetti, Eileen Sullivan, Adam Goldman & William K. Rashbaum, 2 Giuliani Associates
Arrested with One-Way Tickets at U.S. Airport, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/
10/us/politics/lev-parnas-igor-fruman-arrested-giuliani.html.
2
Id.
3
Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating Fake News and Other Online Advertising,
91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1268 (2018).
4
Citizens United at 10: The Consequences for Democracy and Potential Responses by Congress:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., Civ. Rts., & Civ. Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th
Cong. 73, 77 (2020) (statement of Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law);
Wood & Ravel, supra note 3.
5
Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683,
668–69 (2012).
6
Katherine Shaw, Taking Disclosure Seriously, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. INTER ALIA 18, 18, 28
(2016); Abby K. Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 11, 12 (2018).
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definition of corruption is narrow: it only cares about quid pro quo corruption.
Moreover, majority opinions striking campaign finance regulations have
repeated the legal fiction that some types of spending cannot corrupt—namely
independent expenditures by outside groups like SuperPACs, and expenditures
in ballot initiative campaigns. According to the Court’s rationale, independent
expenditures cannot corrupt because of the ban on coordination with campaigns
for independent expenditures.7 Further, the Court has held that expenditures by
state ballot initiative campaigns cannot corrupt because there is no one on the
other side of the spending—meaning, no candidate—to receive a quid and
perform a quo. These groups receive and spend hundreds of millions of dollars
each cycle. As a result, the main rationale for upholding disclosure requirements
for independent spending and ballot initiatives rests on the informational benefit.
But the Court’s understanding of the informational benefit is incomplete
because it is too narrow. The oft-repeated line from Buckley v. Valeo that
disclosure “allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum” is
correct, as far as it goes.8 On this one-dimensional understanding of how voters
choose a candidate, political scientists have established that, yes, disclosures can
help predict how a candidate will vote once in office.
But we learn more from campaign finance transparency. As I explain in this
Article, social scientists, including myself, have run several studies examining
voter learning from campaign finance information. When survey respondents
learn about a candidate’s position on or support from dark money groups, they
choose different candidates than control group respondents who do not see that
information. And when campaign finance compliance information is available
to voters, voters reward overcompliance and punish noncompliance.
In other words, disclosure and compliance information help voters to learn
about a dimension that the court has not considered: candidate type. For
example, studies on dark money have tested questions of candidate
trustworthiness and find consistent reactions among survey respondents. And
when cued with information about campaign finance noncompliance, voters
update their impressions of a candidate’s trustworthiness, intelligence, ethics
and competence.

7
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–51 (1976) (per curiam); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357
(2010); Brief of Amicus Curiae Former FEC Commissioner Ann M. Ravel in Support of Petitioners at 18–22,
No. 19-1398 (July 21, 2020); Brief Amici Curiae from Legal Scholars of Campaign Finance in Support of
Petitioners at 10–17, Lieu v. FEC, No. 19-1398 (July 29, 2020).
8
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
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These findings point to useful policy innovations for states and cities while
the federal government is unable or unwilling to regulate.9 Disclosure
disclaimers are only used in one jurisdiction—Montana—and they require a
disclaimer that “this communication is funded by anonymous sources” at the end
of a video advertisement or on the face of a still or print advertisement.10 These
disclaimers can inform voters about the parties involved in a campaign without
threatening donor privacy or chilling speech. Another useful innovation is
campaign finance audits conducted either comprehensively or randomly. Audits
are still rare in our elections.
Suppose disclosure disclaimers and campaign finance audits are adopted,
then challenged. The Court should uphold both innovations. The biggest threat
to disclosure disclaimers is that of compelled speech. But stand-by-your-ad
requirements were upheld in McConnell v. FEC against a charge of this nature,
so the precedents are not in challengers’ favor.11 And audits are on even firmer
constitutional footing. It would be hard for challengers to make a First
Amendment claim that audits “chill” speech to the point of violating the right to
free speech. Moreover, in other regulatory contexts, the Court has repeatedly
upheld both audits and the public’s interest in knowing audit results.
The experiment findings also have implications for campaigns and
policymakers. In the absence of regulatory changes, campaigns should publicize
their opponents’ relationship to dark money groups and brag about their own
“clean hands” by comparison. Policymakers should understand the tradeoffs
between the two dimensions of voter information. On the one hand, voters’
ability to predict policy positions is enhanced with broad mandatory disclosure
requirements. On the other, voters’ ability to learn about non-policy attributes of
campaigns, like trustworthiness, is enabled by voluntary disclosures. The more
aggressive a mandatory disclosure regime, the less voters will learn about
candidate trustworthiness when it comes to campaign finance transparency. I
provide several examples of policy levers beyond disclosure disclaimers and
audits, including changing the disclosure threshold, modifying the amount of
donor information made public, and eliminating dark money to the extent
possible.

9
As this Article goes to the printer, the For the People Act of 2021 has been passed by the House and
may receive a floor vote in the Senate. It contains provisions aimed at reducing the amount of “dark” money in
federal elections. See For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4501, 4601 (1st Sess. 2021).
10
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-237 (2016).
11
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196–98 (2003).
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The Article walks through this argument. In Part I, I describe the ways in
which disclosure of the sources of campaign financing in our elections is
incomplete. I then explain, in Part II, the Court’s approach to campaign finance
disclosure and how social science can help inform the true scope of the
information benefit. In Part III, I explain how the Court should address campaign
finance transparency efforts aimed at informing voters on the “valence”
dimension, as well as limitations to my argument. In Part IV, I describe the
implications of the argument for courts, campaigns, and policymakers.
I.

INCOMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF MONEY IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS

Little by little, the courts have emptied the campaign finance regulatory
toolkit by ruling that campaign finance regulations unconstitutionally infringe
on the First Amendment rights to free speech or free association.12 As a result,
regulation of money in elections centers more heavily on disclosure.13 The
Supreme Court has upheld disclosure repeatedly in the past six years.14 While
the existing disclosure regime has significant loopholes, the Court seems
generally bullish on disclosure.
Disclosure comes in a few forms. First is run-of-the-mill campaign
contribution disclosure. Campaigns for federal office that receive direct
contributions15 gather information about donors (name, address, amount
contributed, and employer). If a donor’s aggregate contributions reach the $200
mandatory disclosure threshold, the donor’s information is reported to the FEC
in the periodic filings.16 Most states follow a similar system, though the
mandatory disclosure thresholds vary considerably.17 Disclaimers are another
12
See Jessica Levinson, Full Disclosure: The Next Frontier in Campaign Finance Law, 93 DENV. L. REV.
431, 432–33, 447–48 (2016). Contribution limits and restrictions on contributions from foreign nationals are the
final, major substantive limits in campaign finance regulation. Before the death of Justice Antonin Scalia,
commentators predicted that contribution limits could be the next frontier of deregulation. See, e.g., Michael S.
Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2012). Now that he has passed, much
remains uncertain.
13
Levinson, supra note 12, at 432–33; see Shaw, supra note 6, at 18, 28.
14
Shaw, supra note 6, at 19.
15
Direct contributions are those received by the campaign. I am not referring to donations sent via an
intermediary, like ActBlue or RedWin, which have a different disclosure process. R. Michael Alvarez, Jonathan
N. Katz & Seo-young Silvia Kim, Hidden Donors: The Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance
Data, 19 ELECTION L.J. 1, 4 (2020).
16
Id. at 3–4.
17
Disclosure and Reporting Requirements, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 15, 2015), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/disclosure-and-reporting-requirements.aspx. See generally
Threshold to Disclose Donor, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2019), https://cfinst.github.io/#disclosure?question=
CandDonorExemption&year=2018 (including an interactive map of disclosure thresholds by state and year).
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common type of disclosure. Disclaimers are attached to so-called
“electioneering communications.”18 The stand-by-your-ad requirements, with
the candidate saying, “I’m So and So, and I approve this message,” are the most
familiar example,19 but disclaimers are required on many kinds of political
messaging, like mailers and some (but far from all) online ads.20
In the eyes of the Court, disclosure is a less restrictive means of regulating
campaign finance, so “[t]he Government may regulate . . . political speech
through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that
speech altogether.”21 Until deregulation gained steam, its proponents urged the
Court to adopt this “deregulate and disclose” approach.22 But after some
successes in the courts, some deregulatory groups have turned on disclosure.
Rather than defending disclosure as a less restrictive mean to achieve important
governmental interests, they now argue that, like other campaign finance
regulations, disclosure impermissibly burdens First Amendment speech.23
The existing regulatory framework for disclosure is imperfect, to be sure.
Disclosure requirements are arguably both over and underinclusive. Critics
argue that the current system is overinclusive at the federal level because it
requires disclosure of relatively small contributions—when a supporter’s
aggregate contributions reach $200, the campaign must disclose.24 The anticorruption benefit to government may not be furthered by disclosing such small
amounts. Less has been written about whether small contributions contain
valuable information that improves voter competence—the ability of voters to
choose the people and policies that represent their values. On the one hand, they
may not, because candidates are less likely to respond to small-time contributors.
On the other hand, they may, insofar as one uses the contributions of friends and
neighbors as a heuristic, or informational shortcut, about who to support.
18
Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190 (Oct. 23, 2002) (codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100
and 114); Levinson, supra note 12, at 441.
19
See id. at 441 n.54.
20
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-237 (2016); Wood & Ravel, supra note 3.
21
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
22
DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 883 (5th ed. 2012).
23
Id. at 883–84; see, e.g., DAVID M. PRIMO, INST. FOR JUST., FULL DISCLOSURE: HOW CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAWS FAIL TO INFORM VOTERS AND STIFLE PUBLIC DEBATE 1, 3 (2011), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_
folder/other_pubs/fulldisclosure.pdf. Not all challenges to disclosure come from the political right. The ACLU
has argued that disclosure “violates individual privacy and chills free speech on important issues,” especially for
“individuals who support controversial movements.” Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir. of the Washington
Legis. Off., ACLU, and Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Chief Legis. & Pol’y Couns., ACLU, to the U.S. Senate 2
(July 23, 2010) (available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/Ltr_to_Senate_re_ACLU_
opposes_DISCLOSE_Act.pdf).
24
Alvarez et al., supra note 15, at 3–4 (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(4)(i) (2020)).
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So-called “reformers” argue that the current system is underinclusive
because much of the money that supports campaigns and ballot initiatives cannot
be traced back to its donors. Indeed, if the goal was full disclosure, the Buckley
Court did away with the possibility of full disclosure four decades ago.25 Donors
seeking anonymity have found it in the past few elections by donating to “social
welfare” organizations created under Section 501(c) of the tax code or to
LLCs.26 The groups use the donations to make independent expenditures on
behalf of or against a candidate, but they are not required to disclose their donors
for anything but electioneering communications (which they avoid making).27
These groups also pump money into SuperPACs. The SuperPACs are required
to disclose their contributors to the FEC, but when the contributor is an LLC or
a 501(c) organization, the public is unable to follow the money to its original
source.28 Reformers see 501(c) disclosure as an obvious next step in regulating
campaign finance.29
In framing the debate, deregulation activists focus on donor privacy, and
they frame the concern as a First Amendment problem, bringing lawsuits to
challenge existing laws.30 First Amendment activists and groups preferring
nondisclosure bring challenges to state, local, and federal disclosure
requirements, usually without much luck.31 On the political left, activists attempt
to bring sunlight to political spending through the legislative and regulatory

25

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 63 (1976) (per curiam).
Stan Oklobdzija, I’ll Be Disclosed by Christmas: What ‘Pop-Up PACs’ Can Teach Us About
Disclosure and Dark Money 9 (Dec. 16, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3441922).
27
Presidential Ad Volumes Less than Half of 2012, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT (Oct. 18, 2016),
http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/releases/oct-2016/ (“‘We’re seeing dark money groups that have spent
millions of dollars in Senate races fade away, rather than report their spending to the FEC as they’re required to
do beginning two months before the election,’ said Sheila Krumholz, the executive director of the Center for
Responsive Politics. ‘It’s a way to get around telling the IRS next year that a great deal of their activity was
political, which isn’t supposed to be the case with 501(c) groups.’”).
28
See Tyler J. Kassner, Bringing Dark Money into the Light: 501(c)(4) Organizations, Gift Tax, and
Disclosure, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 471, 476–81 (2014).
29
See Briffault, supra note 5, at 708–09; see also Complaint at 3, Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 245 F.
Supp. 3d 119 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-752) (alleging that the FEC failed to address the use of LLCs to circumvent
disclosure laws); Peter Overby, What’s a 527, Anyway? A Primer, NPR (Aug. 7, 2008, 10:18 AM), http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93368983 (including a series of blog posts and articles tracking
undisclosed funding in 2008 elections).
30
AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, DONOR DISCLOSURE LEGISLATIVE TOOLKIT (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.
alec.org/app/uploads/2017/09/ALEC-Donor-Disclosure-Legislative-Toolkit-1.pdf.
31
See Robert Faturechi, The Conservative Playbook for Keeping ‘Dark Money’ Dark, PROPUBLICA
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-conservative-playbook-for-keeping-dark-money-dark.
26
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processes.32 These “reformers” focus on the benefits of voters having donor
information and of disclosure’s ability to deter corruption.33
While loopholes persist, the Supreme Court has almost always upheld
existing disclosure laws, and it recently denied certiorari on a disclosure
challenge.34 Indeed, the Court has upheld disclosure laws three times in the past
decade, but with “reasoning more broad than deep.”35 No challenge to dark
money in the post-Citizens United world has reached the Supreme Court.36 The
Court’s recent, brief rejections of disclosure challenges should not be
overinterpreted, given the changing composition of the Court and the
deregulatory political climate.37
A. “Dark Money,” “Gray Money,” and Other “Veiled Political Actors”
There are several ways that political money is spent without disclosure. In
this section, I briefly review “dark money,” “gray money,” and other “veiled
political actors.”
32
See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act of 2012, S. 3369, 112th Cong. § 324(a)(2). But see FEC Public Hearing on
the McCutcheon v. FEC Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FEC, https://transition.fec.gov/pages/
hearings/McCutcheonRulemakingPublicHearing.shtml (last visited May 26, 2021) (finding an insufficient
number of votes to open a rulemaking to increase disclosure).
33
See Faturechi, supra note 31.
34
Del. Strong Families v. Denn, 136 S. Ct. 2376 (2016). The Delaware Strong Families case is a familiar
disclosure attack fact pattern, in which a perfectly sympathetic plaintiff will be burdened by disclosure
requirements established by the state and so challenges the requirements. In this particular case, a nonprofit
organization put out a voter guide in 2012 and planned to do so again in 2014. Id. at 2376–77 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In the intervening time, in the wake of the surge in dark money enabled by holes in the federal
disclosure regime, Delaware amended its disclosure laws to require disclosure of donors or persons supplying
“electioneering communications,” which include the voter guide. Id. Delaware Strong Families challenged the
law, because it did not want to disclose donor information. Id. The law would have required disclosure of donors
who earmarked their donations for the voter guide and those who gave more than $100 to the nonprofit during
the election period. Id.
35
Shaw, supra note 6, at 19.
36
Such a challenge would be difficult to win and would have an uncertain policy result, anyway. Dark
money became a problem after congress and—especially—the FEC failed to regulate dark money in the wake
of Citizens United. Agency inaction is usually upheld by the courts, and even if it were not, it would be remanded
to the agency to then act—say, by opening a notice-and-comment rulemaking, at which point a wide array of
policies would be available. Even where agencies act, courts tend to be deferential under the Chevron doctrine.
One attempt to address the dark money problem was Van Hollen v. FEC. In the case, Rep. Chris Van Hollen (DMD) challenged an FEC disclosure regulation for outside groups. 811 F.3d 486, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g en
banc denied, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17528 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Under the regulation, only donors who contribute
to a group’s express advocacy must be disclosed. Id. The D.C. Circuit upheld the regulation under step two of
the Chevron analysis. Id. at 492–95.
37
See Shaw, supra note 6, at 23–24. This is particularly true in light of mixed signals from the Court
regarding how exacting the “exacting scrutiny” should be for disclosure, as well as the fact that Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer were willing to join Justice Thomas in striking down a disclosure provision in McIntyre. See infra
Part III.
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The category of undisclosed spending that most people are familiar with is
money spent by corporations after Citizens United, which allowed corporations
to make independent expenditures from their general treasuries.38 After the case,
the FEC did not pass comprehensive disclosure regulations, and other agencies
were prohibited from doing so with appropriations riders39 or regulatory
decisions.40 This means that corporations are able to spend “dark money” in
campaigns without public disclosure of its source.
A related category of undisclosed political spending is “gray money,” or the
money passed through LLCs and 501(c) organizations, rendering it
untraceable.41 Even if a group, like a SuperPAC, is subject to disclosure laws it
can receive money from other sources, like dark money groups.42 When that
happens, the disclosure of the group subject to disclosure laws only contains the
dark money group’s name, but the money trail goes cold for people hoping to
see the actual individuals behind the expenditure.
There are many other ways that political actors can remain “veiled.”43 First,
donors can give directly to campaigns, parties, or PACs below the disclosure
threshold. When that happens, their identity is not disclosed.44
Groups actively seeking to delay disclosure can make their expenditures late
in the cycle.45 That way, disclosures appear only after the votes have been cast.
A colleague, Stan Oklobdzija, calls these “Pop Up PACs.”46 In recent elections,

38
See Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of
Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 339 (2014).
39
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 132 Stat. 348 (2018) (“None of the funds made available by this
Act shall be used by the Securities and Exchange Commission to finalize, issue, or implement any rule,
regulation, or order regarding the disclosure of political contributions, contributions to tax exempt organizations,
or dues paid to trade associations.”) The most common “dark money” organizational form among those regulated
under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code are so-called non-profit “social welfare” organizations, which
are tax exempt under Section 501(c)(4).
40
See Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations,
84 Fed. Reg. 47,447 (proposed Sept. 10, 2019) (to be codified 26 C.F.R pt. 1); I.R.S. Notice 2019-47, Penalty
Relief Related to Reliance on Revenue Procedure 2018-38 (Nov. 15, 2019).
41
See Anna Massoglia, ‘Dark Money’ Groups Find New Ways to Hide Donors in 2020 Election, OPEN
SECRETS (Oct. 30, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/10/dark-money-2020-new-waysto-hide-donors/.
42
See id.
43
See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in
Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2005).
44
A key exception is when we donate online, through a group like ActBlue, which is considered a conduit
by regulators and therefore must disclose all contributions it handles, regardless of how small. Earmarked
Contributions, FEC (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/earmarked-contributions/.
45
Oklobdzija, supra note 26, at 2.
46
Id.
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they have been funded mostly by parties, though future election cycles may
feature different sources of Pop Up expenditures.47
It is also very common for online advertisements to lack disclaimers that
they should otherwise contain.48 Running paid advertisements online without
disclaimers violates FEC requirements, but it happens a lot, especially by groups
at the fringes of the campaigns.49
Disclosure is therefore far from comprehensive. Its gaps have emerged from
the Court’s deregulation—inviting new spenders in—followed by inaction by
Congress and agencies to close the gaps and demand disclosure from the new
spenders.50 In the next Part, I explain the way the courts analyze campaign
finance disclosure regulations.
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZED CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Buckley v. Valeo constitutionalized the Court’s review of campaign finance
regulations.51 The plaintiffs in the case argued that parts of the Federal Election
Campaign Act violated the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and
association.52 The argument—which won the day—is that money spent in
campaigns is inextricably linked to the speech that it funds, and that speech is
protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, the money that facilitates the
speech should also be protected by the First Amendment.53
Here’s how the review works. Because disclosure is analyzed in a First
Amendment framework, we only reach analysis of the benefits of disclosure if
the Court believes that a regulation infringes upon the First Amendment right to
free speech or association.54 If it does, the Court’s amorphous “exacting
scrutiny” standard requires that we identify a “substantially related,”55 or even

47

Id. at 9.
For more on this, see Wood & Ravel, supra note 3, at 1248–53.
49
See Young Mie Kim, Jordan Hsu, David Neiman, Colin Kou, Levi Bankston, Soo Yun Kim, Richard
Heinrich, Robyn Baragwanath & Garvesh Raskutti, The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets Behind Divisive
Issue Campaigns on Facebook, 35 POL. COMMC’N 515 (2018).
50
See Abby K. Wood, Citizens United Turns 10 Today. Here’s What We’ve Learned About Dark Money,
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/21/citizensunited-turns-10-today-heres-what-weve-learned-about-dark-money/.
51
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
52
Id. at 1.
53
Id. at 19–23, 57–59.
54
For more on the limited and contradictory evidence that disclosure chills speech, see Wood, supra note
6, at 11.
55
See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2008).
48
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“narrowly tailored”56 state interest sufficient to overcome the burden.
Depending on the case, the interest must be “overriding,”57 “sufficiently
important,”58 or even “compelling.”59
The governmental interests the Court has recognized since Buckley are
enforcement, deterring corruption, and providing information to the voters
(understood narrowly).60 The FEC does conduct some enforcement actions
based on the information revealed in campaign finance disclosures, but FEC
enforcement is both slow and rare.61 Deterring corruption is important, and it is
the most discussed rationale in the disclosure context. Nevertheless, under Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court has narrowed its conception of corruption,
undermining states’ efforts to regulate campaign finance.62 That leaves the
governmental interest in informing voters to bear a heavy weight for
governments defending their disclosure regulations, particularly in ballot
initiative campaigns and with outside spenders. As Daniel Ortiz puts it,
“[d]isclosure now hangs on this single thread.”63
Because disclosure regulations are the last robust tool of campaign finance
regulations, it is hardly an overstatement to say that what remains of campaign
finance regulation turns, in large part, on the government’s interest in improving
voter competence. Accordingly, in the following section, I focus on the
informational benefit of disclosure regulations.64 First, I explain the limited
imagination the Court has used to date to describe the informational benefit.
Then, I argue that voters glean much more information from disclosures than the
Court envisions. It is not just the information contained in the disclosures that
informs voters—the quality of the disclosures themselves, and the amount of
information disclosed, provide additional information that can enhance voter
competence. I support my argument with recent social scientific findings.

56

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
58
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
59
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014).
60
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 668 (2012).
61
Meredith McGehee, Fix the FEC: Background Memorandum on New Bipartisan Legislation to
Address a Dysfunctional Agency, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.
org/news/publications-speeches/fix-fec-background-memorandum-new-bipartisan-legislation-address-0.
62
See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 118 (2009).
63
Ortiz, supra note 60, at 666.
64
For more on the anti-corruption benefit, see Wood, supra note 6, at 11.
57
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A. The Informational Benefit
The informational benefit is, essentially, an interest in increasing voter
competence. While voter competence is not mentioned explicitly in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has called it a “First Amendment” interest.65
Scholars have argued that it is a constitutional value66 and that an “effective
accountability” canon or “democracy” canon should be recognized in statutory
interpretation.67
To date, the informational benefit has only been conceived of on the left-toright policy spectrum.68 So, in the current understanding, voter competence
exists where a voter is able to vote as she would if she had full information about
the extent to which the candidates’ preferred policies are aligned with her own.69
As I will explain, by limiting its voter competence assumption to a single
dimension, the Court sells short the benefits of disclosure. But first, I explain
how the Court conceives of how disclosures inform voters.
1. Information on the Policy Dimension
According to the Buckley majority, the information disclosed pursuant to
campaign finance disclosure regulations “allows voters to place each candidate
in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis
of party labels and campaign speeches.”70 The Court went on to say that “[t]he
sources of a candidate’s financial support also alert the voter to the interests to
which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions
of future performance in office.”71 This understanding is so focused on a onedimensional left-to-right policy line that the Court continued, “the governmental
interest in disclosure is diminished when the contribution in question is made to
a minor party . . . . As minor parties usually represent definite and publicized

65

McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93

(2003).
66
Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of ‘Informed Voter’ Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533,
1539 (1999).
67
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1051 (2010); Hasen,
supra note 62, at 73.
68
Ortiz, supra note 60, at 675. For a helpful primer of the ways that lower courts have interpreted the
informational interest, see Lear Jiang, Note, Disclosure’s Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the ‘Informational
Interest’ Advanced by Campaign Finance Disclosure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 506–15 (2018).
69
Garrett, supra note 66, at 1534 (citing Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct
Legislation Elections, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE & DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 147, 149 (Stephen L. Elkins &
Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999)).
70
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
71
Id.
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viewpoints, there may be less need to inform the voters of the interests that
specific candidates represent.”72
I use a running example to illustrate how the Buckley majority thought voters
“place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely.”73 Suppose I
think that a candidate in a Democratic primary is a middle-of-the-road
Democrat, say a 5 out of 10, where 1 is perfectly moderate (almost a moderate
Republican) and 10 is perfectly progressive. The candidate has given plenty of
stump speeches and interviews, and he and his opponent have run ads. Voters
therefore have some information on which to base their assessment of him as a
5 out of 10. Then, at the end of the month, the candidate’s FEC disclosures reveal
that he has received money from anti-abortion activists and the head of the
National Rifle Association.
The candidate’s primary opponent is quick to run an ad publicizing the
contributions from these conservatives. If it is a high-profile election, the media
may also comb through the FEC disclosures and write about them, meaning that
voters will have two opportunities to update their assessments of the primary
candidate’s place on the moderate-to-liberal spectrum. As a result of the ads or
the news story, voters will revise their understanding of the candidate’s policies.
Now they may place him at a 3 out of 10 on the progressivism scale. The new
information indicates that the candidate will be more likely to take meetings
from anti-abortion and pro-gun lobbyists if he wins the election—and he will be
more responsive to those groups in policy making. Access to abortions could be
restricted, and gun regulations could be relaxed by policies that result from those
meetings. If voters prefer a very progressive candidate, this information will
make them less likely to vote for him. If they prefer a middle-of-the-road
candidate, this information might make them more likely to vote for him. Voters
are better able to choose a candidate that will represent their policy desires—
they are more competent as voters—because of the disclosures.
The policy signal from the composition of each candidate’s donor pool has
been documented by scholars. First, donor ideology can be estimated with some
precision. Political scientist Adam Bonica has used repeat donations to state and
federal candidates to estimate donor ideology, or “CF scores.”74 In turn, donor
ideologies, when aggregated by donee-candidates, can be used to estimate floor
votes by members of Congress.75 Indeed, donations are as accurate at predicting
72
73
74
75

Id. at 70.
Id. at 67.
Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 373–76 (2014).
Adam Bonica, Inferring Roll-Call Scores from Campaign Contributions Using Supervised Machine

WOOD_6.22.21

2021]

6/22/2021 10:01 AM

LEARNING FROM CAMPAIGN FINANCE INFORMATION

1105

floor votes of incumbents as the incumbents’ prior votes.76 This suggests that
campaign finance disclosures are highly informative along the policy dimension.
Even under the policy-only understanding of voter competence, an
informational problem exists when so much of campaign financing by outside
groups goes undisclosed. Individuals and outside groups, like SuperPACs and
501(c) organizations, can spend unlimited amounts to support or oppose a
candidate. The Supreme Court has ruled that this independent spending does not
corrupt.77 Nevertheless, disclosure provides a more credible signal of policy
preferences than the voter would have in the absence of disclosure, in which case
the voter would only have stump speeches, ads, and other political messaging as
information to guide her vote choice. The absence of disclosure information
from outside groups, therefore, probably makes scholarly estimates of floor
votes less precise than they would be if the sources of corporate expenditures
were required to be disclosed. This is supported by a recent study of incidentally
released data about donors to dark money groups by Stan Oklobdzija.78 The data,
released in the course of litigation, contained the identities of donors to a large,
conservative dark money group active in a California ballot initiative
campaign.79 Oklobdzija found that donors to the dark money group were more
liberal, as measured by their publicly disclosed spending to other campaigns,
than donors who gave directly to the ballot initiative campaign itself (the
disclosed donors).80
To illustrate further, imagine a wealthy Hollywood producer, known for
progressive stances and issues, including direct (disclosed) contributions to
progressive candidates and ballot initiative campaigns. Suppose the producer
also wants to support a tax cut that is on the ballot, but he would prefer to do so
anonymously. He therefore makes this conservative contribution to a dark
money group that supports the ballot proposition. His ideology estimate, which
is based on his disclosed contributions, would not contain the anonymous
contribution. Therefore, if the list of contributors was exposed, as it was in the

Learning, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 830, 831 (2018). The same effect could be achieved by replacing the donor’s name
with a donor ID number, so that the donor’s name does not become public. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Abby
K. Wood, Political Ignorance: Law, Data, and the Representation of (Mis)Perceived Electorates, 52 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REV. 571, 594, 617–19 (2018); see infra Part IV.C.1.
76
Bonica, supra note 75, at 838.
77
See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics
After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1102–03 (2011).
78
Stan Oklobdzija, Public Positions, Private Giving: Dark Money and Political Donors in the Digital
Age, RSCH. & POL. 1, 1 (2019).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 2.
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case that Oklobdzija analyzes, his contribution would appear to come from
someone fairly progressive.
If the same ideological mismatch between disclosed and “dark” spending
exists in candidate campaigns—and why would it not?—our estimates of
candidate ideology will be less precise than they would be in a world with full
disclosure. Voters dislike uncertainty and may vote accordingly.81 If
transparency is especially important to a voter, then she may abandon a
candidate who is closer on policy but less transparent for a candidate who has
less desirable policy proposals but has demonstrated a commitment to
transparency.82
What is more, the amount of uncertainty in the contribution data will vary
from election to election and seat to seat, depending on how many contributors
opt to give to “dark” organizations and corporations. The current disclosure rules
and loopholes therefore leave the amount of uncertainty in the system to the
whims of contributors, rather than under the control of regulators.
In sum, we are able to estimate candidate policy preferences using
contributions. However, the little information we have from dark money groups
indicates that at least some of their donors may differ from direct contributors.
That means that our estimates are less precise than they would be if the names
of all political donors—including to outside groups—were forced to be
disclosed. We do not know the amount of noise that is introduced. At the
moment, it may not be much, given how well Bonica’s CF scores can predict
legislative floor votes. But the government has no control over the share of our
political contributions that are disclosed and therefore the amount of
measurement error in the data that helps us to predict the policies candidates will
enact once in office.

81
Campaign management courses agree and urge their candidates to distinguish themselves with their
transparency, saying that the voter demand for transparency is here to stay. See The Importance of Transparency
in Your Political Campaign, GEO. WASH. UNIV. GRADUATE SCH. POL. MGMT. (May 29, 2020), https://gspm.
online.gwu.edu/blog/the-importance-of-transparency-in-your-political-campaign/.
82
Note that it would not require a strong preference for transparency for this voting pattern to occur.
Voters could abandon candidates who are exactly aligned with their policies (according to stump speeches and
disclosed contributors) but potentially responsive to undisclosed groups with whom the voter disagrees, to vote
for a candidate who is less well aligned with the voter’s policy preferences but a “known quantity” because all
of her supporters are disclosed. Put simply, voters might prefer the less politically aligned “sure thing” over the
more politically aligned wild card.
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a. Studies of How Voters Learn and Use the Information
We have established that the contributions themselves allow us to estimate
which policies candidates will support, providing information along the left-toright political spectrum. But do voters actually receive the information and learn
from it? The answer is that some do, some of the time, as with any other
information about political candidates.
The media is the key intermediary between the government and voters,
disseminating campaign finance information in campaigns of interest to each
outlet’s readers.83 Of course, the media only picks up a fraction of possible
campaign finance stories.84 Studies suggest that the media is more likely to pick
up stories about scandals when the news cycle is slow,85 campaigns are
competitive, or the opponent amplifies media stories about the scandal.86
Scandals aside, opposition researchers can also pump out information about the
opponent’s funders, emphasizing that the other side is supported by the fossil
fuel industry or is the preferred candidate of out-of-state progressives. These
stories may be picked up by the media as well, but, aside from the presidential
campaigns, most campaigns’ disclosures will receive patchwork media
coverage, at best.
Do voters learn from the information? Improvement in voter competence
from disclosures can be difficult to measure because there are so many
intervening variables between the disclosure itself and the information the voter
uses to make her choice. In the rest of this subsection, I review the political
science literature on voter competence.
Political scientists dispute the baseline level of voter competence upon
which campaign finance disclosures may build.87 We know that voters are
“rationally ignorant,”88 yet voters also have a lot of information available to

83
Raymond J. La Raja, Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign Disclosure on News
Reporting in the American States, 6 ELECTION L.J. 236, 237 (2007).
84
Id. at 239, 246; Ben Gaskins, Ellen Seljan, Todd Lochner, Katie Kowal, Zane Dundon & Maya Gold,
From the FEC to the Ballot Box: Voter Accountability for Campaign Finance Law Violations, 47 AM. POL.
RSCH. 1000, 1008 (2018).
85
Brendan Nyhan, Scandal Potential: How Political Context and News Congestion Affect the President’s
Vulnerability to Media Scandal, 45 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 435, 450–55 (2015).
86
Brian J. Fogarty, Scandals, News Coverage, and the 2006 Congressional Elections, 30 POL. COMMC’N
419, 427–28 (2013).
87
JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 42–52 (1992); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts
Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 63, 64, 72 (1994).
88
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–59 (1957).
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them.89 We only use information that is valuable to us—meaning that it
improves knowledge and helps us make more accurate choices, given our
preferences.90 Campaign finance information can serve that role for undecided
or persuadable voters who actually need the information to help them make
choices that fit their preferences. The informational benefits of campaign finance
information should be largest for these undecided or persuadable voters.
Voters operate based on heuristics like a candidate’s party identification.91
It may not seem like it in the months leading up to the November election season,
but most elections in the U.S. are either nonpartisan or feature candidates from
the same party. Consider party primary elections, nonpartisan judicial elections,
nonpartisan city elections, elections in states dominated by one party that have
top-two primaries, and ballot initiatives. Voters cannot use party identification
as a heuristic in any of these kinds of elections. Without party identification as
an available shortcut, voters look to other heuristics, like endorsements and
campaign finance information. In a general election, party identification should
be a more powerful heuristic than campaign finance disclosure.92 Recent work
by Rhodes et al. shows this to be the case, though the informational effects of
campaign finance disclosure persist even in the face of partisan cues.93
In a seminal study on heuristics, Arthur Lupia showed that voters use
campaign finance information as a heuristic in the ballot initiative context.94
Lupia analyzed voter behavior in a year when there were five competing
initiatives on the California ballot, all pertaining to insurance reform.95 Voters
were able to make the choice that best aligned with their preferences if they knew
which of the five ballot initiatives was supported by the insurance industry.96
Cheryl Boudreau and Scott MacKinzie ran a similar study using a survey
experiment. They found that donor information influenced opinions about the

89
The information varies in quality and is used with varying amounts of sophistication. See Rachel
Bernhard & Sean Freeder, The More You Know: Voter Heuristics and Information Search, 42 POL. BEHAV. 603
(2018).
90
“Reasoned choice does not require full information; rather, it requires the ability to predict the
consequences of actions. We define this ability as knowledge.” ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 2 (James E. Alt & Douglass C.
North eds., 1998).
91
Samuel C. Rhodes, Michael M. Franz, Erika Franklin Fowler & Travis N. Ridout, The Role of Dark
Money Disclosure on Candidate Evaluations and Viability, 18 ELECTION L.J. 175, 187 (2019).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Lupia, supra note 87, at 65–66.
95
Id. at 63.
96
Id.
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initiative, that the effect was as large as party or policy information, and that the
largest effects were among the best-informed voters.97
In some contexts, voters’ ability to glean information from heuristics may
be limited because their signal is too noisy. A working paper by David
Broockman, Aaron Kaufman, and Gabriel Lenz describes a survey in which the
authors presented survey respondents with the names of special interest groups,
many of which are involved in campaign financing.98 Respondents performed
poorly in placing the special interest groups on an ideological spectrum across
several experiments.99 The founders of PACs and 501(c)(4) groups often give
them ambiguous names, increasing the “noise” in the signal, and reducing the
heuristic value of their names. These findings can be used by reformers to argue
for increased disclosures. Bonica-style ideology estimation is possible only with
disclosure.
So far, the discussion has covered what we know about voters’ ability to
place a candidate or campaign on a left-to-right political or ideological spectrum.
This is a limited perspective on a benefit that I argue is multidimensional.
Information about campaign finance transparency—and compliance—can help
us predict the kind of public official a candidate will be in office. This nonpolicy, or “valence” information, has nothing to do with the left-to-right policy
spectrum. It introduces another dimension to voters’ evaluations of candidates.
2. The Ignored Benefit of Campaign Finance Disclosure: Candidate
“Valence” Information
Voters care about more than policy. A long line of studies in political science
establishes the importance of voter evaluations of non-policy traits, which we
call “valence” characteristics.100 Campaign finance disclosures and campaign
97
Cheryl Boudreau & Scott MacKinzie, Follow the Money? How Donor Information Affects Public
Opinion about Initiatives, POL. RSCH. Q. (Feb. 15, 2021) (available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/
10.1177/1065912921990744); cf. David M. Primo, Information at the Margin: Campaign Finance Disclosure
Laws, Ballot Issues, and Voter Knowledge, 12 ELECTION L.J. 114, 118–19 (2013) (designing an experiment in
which it was harder for voters to find campaign finance information among other information provided, and
finding smaller learning effects, possibly as a result of the study’s design).
98
David E. Broockman, Aaron R. Kaufman & Gabriel S. Lenz, Heuristic Projection: How Interest Group
Cues Can Harm Voters’ Judgments 12–13 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Working Paper) (available at https://osf.io/
6yskq/download).
99
Id.
100
Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House
Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 371, 371 (2010); Donald E. Stokes, Spatial Models of Party Competition, 57 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 368, 373 (1963); see WILLIAM T. BIANCO, TRUST: REPRESENTATIVES AND CONSTITUENTS 2
(John E. Jackson & Christopher H. Achen eds., 1994); Carl McCurley & Jeffrey J. Mondak, Inspected by
#1184063113: The Influence of Incumbents’ Competence and Integrity in U.S. House Elections, 39 AM. J. POL.
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finance regulatory compliance information enable voters to evaluate not just
candidates’ policies, but the candidates themselves. A candidate who is
supported by dark money groups may have something to hide. That possibility
undermines voters’ evaluation of candidates’ trustworthiness, as I explain
below.
Most voters do not scroll lists of candidate donations on FEC.gov. To
evaluate the quality and extent of campaign finance disclosures, voters usually
require the assistance of information intermediaries and audits. “Information
intermediaries” are any entity that digests and disseminates campaign finance
information, such as the media, transparency advocacy groups, and even the
candidates themselves, who might brag about the information contained in their
disclosures (like Bernie Sanders’s oft-repeated 2016 claim that his average
contribution was $27)101 or who might use candidates’ campaign disclosures
against them. “Audits” are any review of campaign finance disclosures, not
necessarily by an accountant or by the government.102 Information
intermediaries, particularly those who have expertise in transparency and
SCI. 864, 864–65 (1995); JEFFREY J. MONDAK, NOTHING TO READ: NEWSPAPERS AND ELECTIONS IN A SOCIAL
EXPERIMENT 1 (1995).
Valence characteristics were front-and-center in the 2016 elections. Both candidates received low
likeability evaluations. Lydia Saad, Trump and Clinton Finish with Historically Poor Images, GALLUP (Nov. 8,
2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/197231/trump-clinton-finish-historically-poor-images.aspx. The 2016
presidential campaigns focused on other non-policy factors, as well. Democrats emphasized how unfit and
unprepared Donald Trump was to be commander-in-chief. See, e.g., Kevin Liptak, Obama Says Trump ‘Unfit’
for Presidency, CNN (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/02/politics/obama-says-trump-unfit-forpresidency/index.html. Hillary Clinton and her surrogates were sure to emphasize how Trump could not be
trusted with the nuclear arsenal. See, e.g., Jeremy Diamon, New Clinton Ad Questions Trump’s Fitness to
Command Nuke Arsenal, CNN (Oct. 7, 2016, 10:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/07/politics/hillaryclinton-donald-trump-nuclear-arsenal/index.html. The media and the Trump campaign made much hay out of
Clinton’s use of a private email address and server during her time as Secretary of State, casting her as
“untrustworthy” as a result. See, e.g., Clare Foran, The Curse of Hillary Clinton’s Ambition, ATLANTIC (Sept. 17,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/clinton-trust-sexism/500489/.
101
Philip Bump, Bernie Sanders Keeps Saying His Average Donation is $27, But His Own Numbers
Contradict That, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2016, 10:46 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2016/04/18/bernie-sanders-keeps-saying-his-average-donation-is-27-but-it-really-isnt/.
102
Audits can range in stringency and invasiveness from a look at what is actually disclosed to a look at
the campaign’s books, bank statements, and receipts. See OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUM. RTS.,
HANDBOOK FOR THE OBSERVATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE 47–48 (2015). Opposition researchers, transparency
groups, and the media can easily do the former kind of audit and already do in some races. Corporate
contributions—which are illegal in many states and for federal candidates—and excessive contributions are
easily detectible and appear frequently in disclosures. Who Can and Can’t Contribute, FEC, https://www.fec.
gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/who-can-and-cant-contribute/ (last visited May
26, 2021); Campaign Contribution Limits: Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 4, 2019), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contribution-limits-overview.aspx (finding that “22
states completely prohibit corporations from contributing to political campaigns”). Detailed audits require access
and expertise, and they should lend credibility to disclosures beyond the credibility boost given by a look at the
disclosures themselves.
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disclosure, also audit disclosures, though they do not typically have access to the
underlying documentation and receipts behind the disclosures.103 Audits,
especially when conducted by a trusted or neutral party, enhance the credibility
of disclosures.104
Audits can also reveal whether a candidate is a compliant or noncompliant
type. Noncompliance can lead to scandals that might harm candidate
reputations.105 Of course, the communication of a candidate being a compliant
or noncompliant type only matters if two things are true: (1) voters will care,
and (2) campaigns realize that voters will care and avoid compliance problems
accordingly. Research indicates that voters do care, especially in party primaries
and non-partisan elections.106 Candidate behavior indicates that at least some
campaigns realize that voters care and structure their behavior accordingly.107
Thus, audits and compliance information more generally builds on the nonpolicy information that is gained solely from disclosure.
Deterrence theory holds the mechanism. As deterrence theory teaches us,
when the probability of detection increases, the likelihood of realizing the costs
associated with being caught violating the rules also increases.108 In turn, the net
benefit of breaking rules decreases.109 Audits, therefore, shift the balance against
the marginal fraudulent behavior in campaign financing.
Deterrence often operates through “reputation markets,” which impose the
cost on violating entities. Reputation markets exist among taxpayers110 and
industries engaged in environmental information releases,111 and between
103
See, e.g., 2016 Presidential Race, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/
(last visited May 26, 2021) (providing a summary of campaign funding by candidate, as well as outside
committees, sector and industry totals, SuperPAC donors, and more).
104
Accounting research has established that audits enhance the credibility of disclosures and that
information intermediaries can be useful in communicating with the public, which often means communicating
with shareholders. For a summary, see Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Paleu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON.
405, 413 (2001).
105
Nyhan, supra note 85, at 443.
106
See infra Part III.
107
Dave Levinthal, Mum’s the Word: Some Democratic Presidential Hopefuls Won’t Discuss Their BigDollar ‘Bundlers’, PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 22, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/elections/bundlerspresident-election-2020.
108
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 180 (1968).
109
See id. at 204–05; Francesca R. Jensenius & Abby K. Wood, Caught in the Act but Not Punished: On
Elite Rule of Law and Deterrence, 4 PA. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFS. 686, 688–89 (2016).
110
Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L.
REV. 675, 692 (2012).
111
The market rewards “superior performance” and punishes revelations of poor performance. See
Clifford Rechstchaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the Future of Environmental
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corporations, consumers, and shareholders.112 Bad publicity reduces trust, which
costs regulated parties in the private sector, especially in areas like fraud and
product safety.113 These findings also suggest that overcompliance in the face of
a reputational market is not irrational.114
In the campaign context, the relevant reputation market comprises the voters,
the media, opposition candidates, and interest groups. A robust reputation
market in campaign finance is important because the governmental enforcement
mechanisms are weak. Penalties for campaign finance violations are small and
delayed.115 The small, delayed penalties are by design, and they serve the
interests of both the incumbent legislators and regulators. Incumbent legislators’
discount on time is very large and dictated by the election cycle. Regulators are
overseen by the incumbents whose campaigns they regulate. Legislators have
historically been willing to defund campaign finance enforcement programs that
they interpret as being overly aggressive or overly intrusive into their reelection
campaigns.116 As a result, without a reputation market facilitated by the
informational intermediaries in this domain—the media and watchdog groups—
campaigns would have little incentive to comply with campaign finance
regulations, and voters would know less about the candidates and initiatives on
the ballot.
Several empirical studies have examined how voters learn from campaign
finance disclosures. They help us understand the size of voter learning effects
on this non-policy dimension. The studies provide information about the extent
and quality of campaign finance disclosures. I turn to them now.
a. Studies of Voter Reactions to Donor Anonymity and Legal
Noncompliance
Information about the extent of disclosures teaches voters about campaign
transparency. In particular, it seems to help voters evaluate how trustworthy they
find candidates. Compliance-related information is separately informative but
requires audits or additional information over-and-above what the disclosures
themselves provide. Many studies combine the two types of information; though
Enforcement, 30 ENV’T L. REP. 10803, 10819–20, 10827–28 (2000) (listing studies).
112
Hope M. Babcock, Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate “Greenwashing” or a
Corporate Culture Game Changer?, 21 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2010).
113
Nicholas R. Parillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies
and Industries, 36 YALE J. REGUL. 165, 210–11 (2019).
114
Babcock, supra note 112, at 37–38.
115
See DANIEL I. WEINER, FIXING THE FEC: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 4 (2019).
116
See Abby K. Wood, The FEC’s Institutional Predicament, 45 ADMIN. & REGUL. L. NEWS 1, 4–6 (2019).
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in describing these studies for readers, I try to separately explain the two types
of information the researchers provide to respondents. The key conceptual
takeaway is that disclosure information alone can be used to teach voters about
candidate types. This is why I argue that the information benefit of disclosures
is multidimensional—it is not just about policy on the left-to-right spectrum.
When we add audits of the disclosed campaign finance information to reveal
compliance information, the non-policy informational benefits are even
stronger.
The most common strategy in social science research about campaign
finance information is to explain to respondents that an ad has anonymous
donors. Respondents can then evaluate the transparency of the campaign in
choosing between two hypothetical candidates or evaluating an advertisement.
For example, Conor Dowling and Amber Wichowsky showed subjects an ad
attacking a state senate candidate.117 An outside group ran the ad, and the ad
included the FEC-required disclaimer.118 The researchers followed the ad with
disclosure information either as a chart of top contributors, a news story about
outside groups generally, or a news story that the outside group had anonymous
contributors.119 Anonymity, when exposed as such, reduced the persuasiveness
of the message.120 It also reduced respondents’ confidence in the credibility or
trustworthiness of the sender of the message.121
Another research team found that respondents viewed disclaimers by outside
groups, including those mentioning the sponsor was funded by small donors, as
most credible and trustworthy.122 Where donors are both large and anonymous,
respondents saw them as much less credible and trustworthy.123
In a series of survey experiments, I present respondents with hypothetical
candidates and measure their reactions to the candidates’ campaign finances as
well as other characteristics.124 The scenarios present candidates running in a
117
Conor M. Dowling & Amber Wichowsky, Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? Anonymity in
Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 41 AM. POL. RSCH. 965, 976–77 (2013).
118
Id. at 973–74.
119
Id. at 982–84.
120
Id. at 985–86.
121
Id. at 981–82.
122
Travis N. Ridout, Michael M. Franz & Erika Franklin Fowler, Sponsorship, Disclosure and Donors:
Limiting the Impact of Outside Group Ads, 68 POL. RSCH. Q. 154, 155 (2015).
123
Id. at 163–64. This research could not distinguish between the effects of donor size and anonymity,
however, necessitating follow-up studies to answer this question.
124
Abby K. Wood, Show Me the Money: Candidate Selection Based on Campaign Finance Transparency,
at app. at A23, A39 (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Research Paper Series No. CLASS17-24, 2018)
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029095); Gaskins et al., supra note 84, at
1023.
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party primary for an open seat for a state office. These choices of party primary
and open seats are intentional. A party primary lacks party name as a heuristic.
A state office is less salient than federal office. And the open seat eliminates the
incumbency advantage.125 In other words, these are where I expect campaign
finance disclosure and compliance information to affect voter choice.
In the first study, I presented respondents with two hypothetical candidates
with similar policy preferences who differed on whether they were supported by
organizations that did not disclose their donors or over-complied with campaign
finance rules.126 On average, respondents rewarded overcompliance and
punished noncompliance, and they rewarded transparency and punished its lack
thereof. The effect is observable in vote choice, candidate preferences, and
trustworthiness ratings. The study suggests that voters to react to “disclosure
disclaimers”: they care about whether a candidate is supported by dark money.
They also find candidates who reveal more than the law requires to be
particularly trustworthy, and, in turn, they are slightly more likely to vote for
them.127
These are interesting results, but how much do voters really care about
transparency when they’re awash in other information about candidates? Will
they trade transparency for their preferred policies? Will they trade transparency
for a candidate’s persuasiveness or grasp of the issues? To test the limits of the
results from the first experiment, I conducted a survey experiment called a
“conjoint analysis.”128 In a conjoint analysis, the researcher randomized a
number of different levels of candidate attributes. Respondents chose their
preferred candidate in different “match ups.” Respondents were able to view
nine randomly presented facts about the candidates’ policy positions
(immigration and sex education), campaign financing (percent small donors,
amount raised, and whether they were supported by anonymous sources),
compliance with campaign finance laws, professional background, and
campaign skills (persuasiveness and grasp of the issues). Even in the face of
candidate policy preferences, respondents were more likely to select a candidate
that discouraged dark money groups from supporting the campaign than one
who received dark money support.
If disclosures are audited, voters can learn about candidate compliance. In
recent years, scholars have studied voter reaction to various types of misbehavior
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and scandal by candidates and public officials. When voters learn about
noncompliance with campaign finance regulations, they rate candidates lower
on trust,129 intelligence, ethics, competence, and general job approval.130
Interestingly, they do not change their evaluation of perceived ideology.131
Voters may also learn about the candidate’s propensity to operate transparently
or engage in corruption.132
My conjoint experiment provided information about compliance with
campaign finance rules alongside other kinds of information. Respondents were
much less likely to select a candidate with campaign finance compliance
problems compared to one who is “in compliance.” They were even slightly
more likely to select a candidate that provided more information than the law
requires, compared to a candidate that is “in compliance,” though the estimate
is just shy of statistical significance in many of the analyses. The degree of
policy mismatch between the respondent and the candidate seemed to have little
impact on the respondents’ reaction to noncompliance and dark money support.
While my studies took place in hypothetical primary elections, a recent study
by Sam Rhodes and coauthors compared voter reactions to a candidate’s
relationship to dark money groups with and without partisan cues.133 The authors
found that voters reacted to candidate support from dark money groups in the
absence of party cues—like my primary setting—but when party cues were
present, the effects, while still statistically different from zero, were less
pronounced.134
129

Wood, supra note 124, at app. A23, A39; Gaskins et al., supra note 84, at 1023.
See Gaskins et al., supra note 84, at 1023.
131
Gaskins, et al. found two exceptions about the effects of scandals, but both are outside of the campaign
finance context. Respondents in their study perceived hypothetical tax evaders to be more conservative than
their non-scandal-ridden (hypothetical) counterparts and hypothetical candidates with sex scandals to be more
liberal. Id.
132
Abby K. Wood & Christian R. Grose, Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators’ Election
Outcomes and Behavior, 65 AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6, 27) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236939). Strictly speaking, disclosure and transparency
are not the same thing. Reporting requirements demand information of persons by government, like individuals
or companies in the private sector. The government, which requires the reports, then discloses them to the public.
See Public Financial Disclosure Guide, U.S. OFF. GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/Web/278eGuide.nsf
(last visited May 26, 2021). Transparency laws, like FOIA or Open Meetings Laws, force government actors to
make decisions publicly. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; Alex Aichinger, Open Meeting Laws and
Freedom of Speech, MIDDLE TENN. STATE UNIV. (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1214/
open-meeting-laws-and-freedom-of-speech. The difference is mostly semantic in the candidate context, where
candidates span the public and private sphere. Candidates for elected office are private individuals vying for
public office—even when they are running as incumbents. Campaign finance disclosure is, at its root, candidate
transparency.
133
Rhodes et al., supra note 91, at 180–81, 183–85.
134
Id. at 180–81, 187–88.
130
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Compliance information, released in the face of partisan cues, can still result
in big voter reactions, as Christian Grose and I have found.135 In 1976, the brandnew FEC decided to audit campaigns for the 1976 House elections.136 Limited
resources forced the agency to audit only a subset, so they randomly selected
10% of campaigns for audit.137 Incumbents who were randomly selected for
audit after the 1976 campaign lost vote share in the 1978 election compared to
the non-audited incumbents.138 They were also more likely to retire, meaning
that we may be underestimating the true effect.139 Where the audits revealed
violations, the effects were even larger.140
Compliance learning effects persist with party cues in the survey
experimental context as well. Gaskin and coauthors found that voters from both
parties punished in-party candidates who were out of compliance, with
Republicans slightly less punitive for financial noncompliance and more
punitive on sex scandals.141
The takeaway from these studies is that respondents evaluate candidates and
messages differently when they learn about the candidate’s relationship to nondisclosing groups, and when they learn about the candidate’s failure to comply
with campaign finance laws. Voters are informed about non-policy
characteristics of candidates when they learn about the campaign’s transparency
and compliance with campaign finance laws. Yet the Court has not taken this
non-policy dimension into account when it considers the benefits of campaign
finance transparency.
III. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE THAT VALUES THE FULL RANGE OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE’S INFORMATIONAL BENEFITS
The Court can expand its view of the benefits of campaign finance
disclosures in a way that is incremental and accords with its jurisprudence in
other areas of the law. After all, campaigns, like corporations, are regulated
entities. The Court has long taken the stance that consumers learn from corporate
disclosures and transparency around corporate compliance issues.142 The
135

See Wood & Grose, supra note 132.
Id. at 8.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 19.
139
Id. at 16.
140
Id. at 17, 20.
141
See Gaskins et al., supra note 84, at 1025.
142
See Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45700, Assessing Commercial Disclosure Requirements Under the First
Amendment 1–2, 4 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45700.pdf.
136
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analogy is obvious: consumers are also voters and can learn from candidate
disclosures and candidate compliance problems. In this Part, I explain why
courts should uphold two policy innovations aimed at improving voter
competence on non-policy dimensions: (1) “disclosure disclaimers” and
(2) audits. Disclosure disclaimers are an idea initially proposed by Dean Heather
Gerken and coauthors in an op-ed.143 Simply put, a disclosure disclaimer would
appear with a political advertisement to inform voters about the role of dark
money in paying for the ad. Audits may be conducted as part of the campaign
finance transparency regulatory process. Audits inform voters about campaign
finance compliance. The research summarized above suggests that candidates’
dark money support and compliance are two issues that voters care about and
can learn from. I take them in turn. I conclude this Part discussing limitations of
the argument.
A. Disclosure Disclaimers
The Court currently assumes that campaign finance disclosures inform
voters of the policies the candidate will support while in office.144 It is only a
half-step to expand the Court’s concept of the informational benefit to include
voter learning that results from, for example, seeing whether candidates are
supported by ads from outside groups with untraceable donors.145 As the
research shows, respondents to survey experiments make different choices when
they learn about candidates’ relationships to dark money groups.146 On average,
they use the information to vote differently in primary elections than they
otherwise would. Respondents deem the more transparent candidates to be more
trustworthy. In the same way that the Justices believe that disclosure informs
voters about the policies a candidate might support in office, it also informs
voters about non-policy characteristics—especially trustworthiness—that are
important to voters.147
Importantly, no additional government disclosures are required to assist
voters in learning about candidate type. Journalists and other intermediaries can
continue to highlight the types of support a candidate or ballot initiative
receives—including dark money support—and voters can continue to vote
accordingly. And of course, intermediaries could systematically produce
143
Heather K. Gerken, Wade Gibson & Webb Lyons, Rerouting the Flow of ‘Dark Money’ into Political
Campaigns, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rerouting-the-flow-ofdark-money-into-political-campaigns/2014/04/03/1517ac6e-b906-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html.
144
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
145
See Gerken et al., supra note 143.
146
See supra Part II.C.
147
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
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information in the mode of Dean Gerken’s “disclosure disclaimers” to help
inform voters across all campaigns about campaign finance transparency.148
Acknowledgment of the full scope of the informational benefit will help to
bolster disclosure regulations against challenges. This is especially helpful for
regulations requiring disclosure of donors to ballot initiative campaigns and to
outside groups, where the Court has decided that the anti-corruption benefit is
not available as a governmental interest in disclosure.149
Part of the discomfort about disclaimers is that they are speech that the
government requires to appear on the face of a political communication. Could
“disclosure disclaimers” be struck as compelled speech? In 2002, seven years
after McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission declared an Ohio disclaimer
requirement unconstitutional, a district court struck down a required disclaimer
that a recommendation in a mailer contrary to the “official endorsement” of the
state party contain a statement that it was “NOT THE POSITION” of the
party.150 But the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s stand-by-your-ad
requirement was upheld the following year by the Supreme Court in McConnell
v. FEC.151 Moreover, the McConnell Court referred to the voters’ information
interest as constitutional in nature.152 While the jurisprudence is slightly murky,
the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell suggests that courts would uphold
a challenge to a narrowly tailored disclosure disclaimer.
In the next section, I discuss the jurisprudence that relates to campaign
finance audits, the best mechanism to reveal compliance information.
B. Audits and Compliance Information
Information about candidate compliance with campaign finance laws may
affect votes even more than information about a candidate’s relationship to dark
money.153 Candidate compliance information is available through campaign
finance audit programs.
148

Id.
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 233 (2010) (“Similarly, because ‘[r]eferenda are held on issues, not
candidates for public office,’ the ‘risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is
not present in a popular vote on a public issue.’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790
(1978))).
150
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1995); Levine v. Fair Pol. Pracs. Comm’n,
222 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1184, 1191 (E.D. Cal 2002).
151
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 94 (2003).
152
Id. at 196. California’s requirement that political ads be accompanied by a top-five donor disclosure
disclaimer has not yet been challenged in court.
153
See supra Part II.C.
149
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Some audits involve publicly financed campaigns, such as audits conducted
by the New York City Campaign Finance Board.154 An added justification for
these audits is to ensure that the public’s money is not being used fraudulently.155
But most campaign finance regulators administer programs involving 100%
private money. For example, the Fair Political Practices Commission in
California does not administer a public financing campaign, yet it still audits
10% of campaigns raising small amounts and 25% of campaigns raising larger
amounts.156 In private money regimes, the justification of ensuring that the
public’s money is not misspent is not available.
Put aside the political challenges of getting an audit program through
incumbent legislators to whom the reputational damage of noncompliance
accrues. If it were to exist, an audit program should be upheld by the courts,
especially against the First Amendment challenges that are so common against
campaign finance regulations.
The courts have long recognized the informational benefits of compliance
information in the consumer and watchdog context. For example, the D.C.
Circuit has recognized the value of information regarding environmental
compliance to investors evaluating the performance of a company because “the
ability to avoid [compliance] problems provides an index to management’s
overall quality.”157
Plaintiffs challenging disclosure of campaign-related information allege that
information about enforcement actions will create reputational damage.158
Because of the assumed information transmission to the reputational market,
courts are particularly willing to allow pre-enforcement challenges to
regulations in instances where the damage may be “irreparable” or accrues to a
heavily regulated industry.159
154

About The CFB, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., https://www.nyccfb.info/about (last visited May 26,

2021).
155

Id.
Audit Program, CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, https://fppc.ca.gov/enforcement/audit-program.html
(last visited May 26, 2021).
157
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1205–06 (D.D.C. 1977), rev’d on other grounds,
606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
158
Doe v. FEC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 160, 172 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 920 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
159
The line of cases begins with Abbott Labs v. Gardner, which challenged a regulation that would have
required the company to either come into compliance at great cost or be out of compliance while challenging the
rule. 387 U.S. 136, 152–54 (1967). The Court allowed the company to challenge the regulation before it was
enforced, noting the difficult situation that the company was in. Id. However, where the reputational damage
may not accrue, the courts are less likely to grant an injunction to allow a pre-enforcement challenge. In Toilet
Goods Association v. Gardner, the FDA interpreted a provision of the FDCA to require companies to allow
inspectors in or potentially suffer suspension of certification services for color additives. See 387 U.S. 158, 161
156
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But reputational damage is hardly a reason to strike down a campaign
finance audit program. If anything, as in the consumer context, “one purpose of
[transparency] is to utilize public opinion as a lever in insuring compliance with
the nation’s statutory goals.”160 A challenge claiming reputational damage to
political candidates is unlikely to succeed in light of the jurisprudence. Indeed,
the FEC’s disclosure policy around its conciliation agreements, under which the
agency discloses the nature of campaign finance violations, including the party
that committed the infraction (among other information),161 was recently upheld
by the D.C. Circuit.162
In Doe v. FEC, plaintiffs filed suit to prevent the FEC from disclosing their
identities when it publicly released information pertaining to a closed
investigation.163 The court ruled that disclosure was appropriate despite alleged
reputational harm “arising from the fact that they were under investigation”
because, unlike a reasonable showing that plaintiffs would be subject to “threats,
harassment, or reprisals,” mere reputational harm does not prohibit disclosure of
their identities.164
The courts have also invalidated laws demanding the non-disclosure of
compliance problems by public officials. In Stilp v. Contino, Judge Conner’s
order invalidated § 1108(k) of the Pennsylvania Public Official and Employee
Ethics Act, which prohibited disclosure of the fact that a complaint was filed
with the Commission.165 The judge ruled that the government’s asserted interest
of “prevent[ing] damage to the reputation of government officials where the
allegations were unfounded” does not justify a blanket prohibition on
(1967). The Court refused the injunction in this case because the injury was only speculative. Id. at 165. In the
case of random campaign finance audit, the injury is also only speculative. Assuming limited auditing capacity,
audits will be conducted randomly. A subset of campaigns—probably comprising the majority of campaigns—
will not be audited. See supra Part II.C. If audited, the audit report can be “clean” (and potentially help the
candidate) or show violations of varying degrees of severity. See Wood & Grose, supra note 132, at 3. Thus,
there are at least two steps between the decision to conduct random audits and the reputational damage: (1) being
audited and (2) the audits revealing violations.
“Irreparable” may not be a concept that travels well to the context of political campaigns. A violation
that is uncovered late in an electoral cycle is more likely to be “irreparable” when compared to a violation that
is uncovered early in a cycle and that the campaign quickly resolves. Campaign finance regulators have several
steps in their enforcement processes. To actually be fined, a campaign has to fail to come into compliance
repeatedly. See Wood, supra note 6, at 23. But reputational damage can attach before the fine itself.
160
United Techs. Corp. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 845, 854–55 (D. Conn. 1979).
161
The guidance document on the disclosure policy enumerates twenty-one pieces of information to be
disclosed for closed matters. See Notice on Disclosure of Certain Documents in Enforcement and Other Matters,
81 Fed. Reg. 50,702, 50,703 (Sept. 1, 2016).
162
See Doe v. FEC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 920 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
163
Id. at 162.
164
Id. at 172.
165
Stilp v. Contino, 743 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
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disclosure.166 He said that “absent exceptional circumstances, reputational
interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech,”167 and that
“‘injury to official reputation is an insufficient reason for repressing speech that
would otherwise be free.’”168 The latter quote is from an opinion that resulted
from an even tougher set of facts for those hoping to keep the public from
learning about their campaign finance violations. In Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that a statute
proscribing criminal penalties for anyone who disclosed the existence of a
confidential ethics investigation against a judge—before the outcome was
known—violated the First Amendment.169
Challengers could also argue that their political spending (“speech”) is
unconstitutionally burdened by the additional compliance costs brought about
by the audits. Compliance costs were important to the Citizens United Court and
partly justified the Court’s decision to permit corporations to make independent
expenditures from their general treasuries, rather than establish separate
segregated funds to make the expenditures.170 However, here, campaigns should
already be complying with campaign finance rules, with or without an audit, and
they should incur whatever costs are required to comply. Compliance costs are
common among regulated entities, and we know that audits do create costs, even
for campaigns with perfect books, because campaign staff must spend time with
the auditors. But it is hard to imagine a fact pattern in which the Court would
decide that audits increase costs enough for the Court to flip the switch from
“not burdensome” (in a regime without audits) to “burdensome” (with audits).
An argument that audits raise compliance costs so much that they should be
deemed an unconstitutional infringement on free speech would probably fail to
persuade the Court to strike an audit program.
Campaign finance audits provide benefits to the public aside from improving
voter competence. The benefit of aiding in enforcement of the substantive laws,
recognized in the campaign finance disclosure cases, clearly applies in the
campaign finance audit context.171 As before, the enforcement rationale has been
recognized in other non-campaign-finance contexts. For example, when a
government contractor resisted an executive order requiring disclosure of
statistics about the number of women and minorities employed by the contractor,
166

Id. at 467, 469.
Id. at 469 (first quoting Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 634 (1990); then quoting Landmark
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841–42 (1978)).
168
Id. at 467.
169
Landmark Commc’ns, 435 U.S. at 841.
170
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339, 415 (2008).
171
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976) (per curiam).
167
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the resulting court order said “[t]he mere fact that the company may be
embarrassed by the public disclosure of the [information] . . . is not sufficient to
warrant withholding [the information] . . . . Indeed, it would seem that one
purpose of the [requirement] is to utilize public opinion as a lever in insuring
compliance with the nation’s statutory goals.”172
Most importantly, anti-fraud and anti-corruption rationales attach to audit
programs.173 As long as audits are narrowly tailored to meet these interests, the
audit programs and public release of the resulting compliance information
should withstand judicial scrutiny.
C. Limitations of the Argument
The informational benefit is not limitless. Here, I discuss the contexts in
which campaign finance and compliance information is particularly helpful to
voters, and contexts in which it may matter relatively less (but still matter). I
also address slippery slope arguments.
1. Scope Conditions
As discussed above, people often use heuristics to inform their vote choice,
and campaign finance information will be most beneficial where heuristics are
less available.174 This includes nonpartisan elections, like local elections and
some judicial elections, as well as party primaries. Once we are in the general
election, the heuristic of party dominates, though voters still react to information
about dark money’s involvement in campaigns175 and campaign finance
compliance,176 even where party cues are present.
Heuristics are also less available when the spending comes from outside
groups, which often have confusing or vague names.177 Most outside groups do
not persist across elections,178 so their prior compliance with campaign finance
172

United Techs. Corp. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 845, 854–55 (D. Conn. 1979).
Wood & Grose, supra note 132, at 4. An anti-fraud rationale could attach in the ballot initiative context,
even where the court has made the anti-corruption rationale unavailable by narrowing the definition of corruption
to “quid pro quo.”
174
See supra Part II.A; Wood, supra note 6, at 19.
175
See generally Rhodes et al., supra note 91 (discussing the influence of information about dark money
political sponsorship on voters).
176
Wood & Grose, supra note 132, at 2.
177
See Broockman et al., supra note 98.
178
Paul S. Herrnson, Jennifer A. Heerwig & Douglas M. Spencer, The Impact of Organizational
Characteristics on Super PAC Financing, in THE STATE OF THE PARTIES 2018: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (John C. Green, Daniel J. Coffey & David B. Cohen eds., 8th
ed. 2018).
173
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rules, which could be revealed via audit, is less relevant in this context.
However, whether the groups disclose their donors, and whether some of their
donors are dark money groups (making them “gray money” groups) matters to
voters.179 These issues can be revealed in real time, prior to the election, by
informational intermediaries or disclosure disclaimers.
Finally, voters in ballot initiative states can learn from disclosure
disclaimers.180 Understanding who donates to groups helps voters make a choice
that is in line with their policy interests.181 Understanding whether either side of
the ballot initiative contest has benefited from (or rejected) dark money is
probably also helpful to voters. They may make an adverse inference against the
side supported by dark money, assuming that the money comes from out-ofstate, for example. With ballot initiatives, various features of the campaign
combine to make information about dark money more or less helpful. The more
confusing the language in the initiative, the vaguer the funding group’s name,
and the more competing initiatives on the ballot, the more helpful that
“disclosure disclaimers” will be to voters.
Outside groups making independent expenditures and ballot initiative
campaigns are categories in which the courts do not recognize the government’s
interest in preventing corruption as compelling. The informational and
enforcement benefits are all that remain to support disclosure regulations should
they come under attack from deregulatory groups.182
In sum, this theory of an expanded informational benefit has purchase in the
majority of elections: primary elections, nonpartisan elections, and even nonsalient local, county, and state elections. The scope of the informational benefit
will be less important where voters are awash in information, like in general
elections for federal office. The informational benefit matters most where the
courts will not recognize the government’s anti-corruption interest.
2. The Slippery Slope
Of course, slippery slope arguments abound. An aggressive court’s
interpretation of “non-policy information” could be abusively broad. If it is
179

Dowling & Wichowsky, supra note 117, at 985.
See Wood, supra note 6, at 19.
181
Id.; see Boudreau & MacKinzie, supra note 97.
182
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 233 (2010) (“Similarly, because ‘[r]eferenda are held on issues, not
candidates for public office,’ the ‘risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is
not present in a popular vote on a public issue.’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790
(1978))).
180
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acceptable to evaluate candidates based on their perceived trustworthiness, as
political science research shows that voters do when they learn about dark
money support, then what other non-policy information may governments
require campaigns to disclose? If voters like trustworthiness, they probably also
like generosity. Should the government release candidate tax returns? Voters
probably like conscientiousness and intelligence. Should the government
disclose candidates’ college transcripts? Where does the voters’ need for
candidate information stop and candidates’ right to privacy start?
As with all government regulations, there are lines to be drawn. Here,
Congress and the FEC drew the lines long ago, and a lot of campaign finance
information is already disclosed to voters.183 “Disclosure disclaimers” can be
made without demanding any more information from candidates or campaigns,
or making publicly disclosed information that is not currently public.
When it comes to campaign finance audits and disclosure of the audit results,
if noncompliance in the campaign finance realm is informative to voters,
information about other legal noncompliance may also help voters to learn. How
is information about campaign finance compliance different from information
about other kinds of legal compliance (obeying traffic laws, tax laws, labor laws,
etc.)? My answer is that it is not. Information about legal violations is available
to the public unless expunged from the candidate’s record.184
We are all regulated by the state and subject to periodic audit as to whether
we are violating the laws.185 Random TSA checks at airports, sobriety
checkpoints, and tax audits are all ways we, as people engaging with the
regulatory state, encounter audits. Corporations are also subject to audits of their
environmental or labor practices. Candidates are regulated entities, too. They opt
into a regulatory regimethat of campaign financingand the government can
audit their compliance.
As our study of the FEC audits suggests, information that results from audits
is helpful to voters.186 But that does not mean that the voters are entitled to learn
all information that might be helpful to them as they make their choices.
183

See 2 U.S.C. § 431–442.
See, e.g., Violation Tracker Agency Summary Page, GOOD JOBS FIRST, https://violationtracker.
goodjobsfirst.org/prog.php?agency_sum=EPA (last visited May 26, 2021) (listing top EPA regulatory violators);
Examples of Employment Tax Fraud Investigations – Fiscal Year 2017, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/compliance/
criminal-investigation/examples-of-employment-tax-fraud-investigations-fiscal-year-2017 (last visited May 26,
2021) (listing employment tax fraud violations).
185
Christian R. Grose & Abby K. Wood, Randomized Experiments by Government Institutions and American Political Development, 185 PUB. CHOICE 401, 404–05 (2019).
186
See Wood & Grose, supra note 132.
184

WOOD_6.22.21

2021]

6/22/2021 10:01 AM

LEARNING FROM CAMPAIGN FINANCE INFORMATION

1125

IV. IMPLICATIONS
The findings and interventions discussed here have implications for courts,
political spenders, and policymakers.
A. For Courts
Disclosure supports the “First Amendment interest[] of individual citizens
seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace.”187 The
information that disclosures, disclosure disclaimers, and audits can provide
improves voter competence in more ways than the courts have currently
recognized. I discuss policy and non-policy information in turn.
Few of the Court’s assumptions about the costs and benefits of disclosure in
Buckley have undergone thorough empirical analysis. The policy dimension of
the informational benefit is the most thoroughly analyzed benefit of
disclosure.188 The research to date indicates that the Court was correct in
assuming that informational benefits of disclosure exist for placing candidates
on the left-to-right spectrum.189 It also indicates that the current regime, which
allows for some independent spending to go undisclosed, probably adds noise to
our estimates of how politicians will vote on the bills before them.190 The failure
to regulate after Citizens United arises from appropriations riders prohibiting the
SEC and IRS from acting.191 The Court would probably call this a problem for
the legislature to resolve; however, to the extent that voter information is a
constitutional value, an argument could be made that the appropriations riders
themselves are unconstitutional. An aggressive stance, to be sure, but a colorable
argument, nonetheless.
When it comes to non-policy information, our research also strongly
suggests that voters learn about the candidates themselvesperhaps their
management abilities, organization, or tendency toward corruptionfrom
compliance with the campaign finance laws.192 Similarly, the evidence suggests
that at least in some contexts, voters are willing to reward overcompliance.193
Finally, on average, voters are less likely to vote for candidates that receive
187
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93
(2003); see also Elmendorf, supra note 67, at 1084 (discussing “voters’ Equal Protection rights and candidates’
and political parties’ First Amendment associational rights”).
188
Bonica, supra note 75, at 831.
189
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 70 (1976) (per curiam).
190
Wood, supra note 6, at 12.
191
See Wood, supra note 50.
192
Wood & Grose, supra note 132, at 6–7, 25.
193
Wood, supra note 124.
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support from dark money groups.194 All of these findings indicate that there is
an informational benefit both from the disclosures themselves (or lack thereof,
for dark money groups), and that the informational benefit is not as much about
policy as it is about the candidate herself. The Court can embrace “disclosure
disclaimers” as well as audits for providing crucial information to voters.
***
The Court should right-size its understanding of the information benefit. But
will it? The chances that the Court will broaden its understanding of voter
competence to encompass this understanding of the information voters receive
through campaign finance disclosures depends in large part on who is on the
Court when the issue is next before them. A careful read of earlier cases reveals
that the Justices who are still on the Court and are friendly to disclosure like it
for deterring corruption and improving voter competence. Moreover, the
Justices’ ideological commitments do not always predict their votes on the
information benefit.
Only two disclosure holdings have turned on the information rationale and
not the anti-corruption rationale. In McIntyre, the liberal wing of the court voted
to strike down an Ohio law requiring disclosure on pamphlets.195 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority and joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, and
Breyer, with Justices Ginsburg and Thomas concurring, ruled that disclaimers
on pamphlets are not that informative to voters, and even if they were, the
informational interest is “plainly insufficient to support the statute’s disclosure
requirement, since the speaker’s identity is no different from other components
of a documents’ contents that the author is free to include or exclude, and the
author’s name and address add little to the reader’s ability to evaluate the
document in the case of a handbill written by a private citizen unknown to the
reader.”196 Justice Thomas concurred, saying that he would have analyzed the
question of disclosure for a pamphleteer using only the original understanding
of “freedom of speech, or of the press,” which he believed led to the majority
opinion overturning the disclosure mandate.197 Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence
emphasized that “in for a calf is not always in for a cow” and that in other
circumstances the state may require a speaker to “disclose its interest by
disclosing its identity.”198 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, both
194
195
196
197
198

Rhodes et al., supra note 91.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 335, 357 (1995).
Id. at 335.
Id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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conservatives, recognized the importance of disclosure to an informed
electorate.199 They challenged the idea that there has ever existed a “hitherto
unknown right-to-be-unknown” when engaging in political speech in a “free,
democratic election.”200
McIntyre did not start a trend. Since that case, the Court has upheld
disclosure requirements in McConnell, Citizens United, and several other cases.
In his McConnell dissent, Justice Thomas complained, “[t]he Court now backs
away from [McIntyre], allowing the established right to anonymous speech to
be stripped away based on the flimsiest of justifications.”201 Of the two Justices
from the McIntyre Era that remain on the Court today (Breyer and Thomas) both
voted to overturn the statute in McIntyre, but only Justice Thomas has continued
to insist that disclosure laws are an unconstitutional infringement on the First
Amendment right to free speech.202
The Citizens United majority opinion for the disclosure issue had support
from Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito from the current Court. The opinion
also supported the idea that the information interest alone can support broad
disclosure requirements, saying that “the public has an interest in knowing who
is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election” and that “the
informational interest alone is sufficient to justify application of” disclosure
rules to the ads the group was running.203 Justice Thomas dissented on that issue,
maintaining his position that McIntyre stands for a right to anonymity in political
speech.204
The Court’s composition has changed since Citizens United was decided in
2010. Two members of the majority—Justices Kennedy and Scalia—are no
longer on the Court. Both Justices were strong proponents of disclosure. Justice
Kennedy believed that disclosure held promise for holding both donors and
spenders accountable in an otherwise deregulated campaign finance system.205
Justice Scalia wrote that “[r]equiring people to stand up in public for their
199

Id. at 371–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 371, 381.
201
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 276 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 480–85 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 274 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369.
204
Id. at 480–85 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205
Id. at 352, 371 (majority opinion) (“With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures
can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials
accountable for their positions and supporters. . . . The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure
permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”).
200
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political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed. For my
part, I do not look forward to a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court,
campaigns anonymously . . . . [A country that allows anonymous campaigning]
does not resemble the Home of the Brave.”206
The three new members of the Court will bring fewer votes for disclosure.
Justice Scalia’s replacement, Justice Gorsuch, is far more skeptical of campaign
finance disclosure. During his confirmation hearing, Justice Gorsuch signaled
his willingness to look closely at disclosure laws, saying that the First
Amendment contains competing interests.207 He said that Buckley stands for the
notion that Congress can regulate money in politics, and that there “may be
limits when it chills expression, as it did in the NAACP case. And we have to be
worried about that[.]”208 Justice Kennedy’s replacement, Justice Kavanaugh,
seems to follow Justice Kennedy’s belief that independent expenditures cannot
corrupt.209 His rulings before he joined the Court suggest that he, like Kennedy,
will be generally skeptical of campaign finance limits and bans.210 His position
206

Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 137 (2018) (statement of thenJudge Neil M. Gorsuch of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit).
208
Id. The entire exchange was fascinating for a student of campaign finance law. It was one of the more
revealing exchanges in the three-day hearing. It continued as follows:
Senator WHITEHOUSE: So if we have to be worried about the chilling of expression, which is a value proposition
that you have just enunciated, should we not—am I not also entitled to ask the question about whether we should
be worried about the influence of dark money essentially corrupting our politics? . . . I am taking a lot of time to
get what I would think would be a fairly simple answer.
207

Judge GORSUCH: Well, I am sorry, but I do not think this is simple stuff at all, Senator. . . . I think
you have First Amendment concerns and precedents . . . in the area . . . that would have to be
considered. We would have to see what law Congress enacted. I would then want to go through
the full judicial process . . . .
Senator WHITEHOUSE: But you just asserted right here that the value of not chilling speech is
something that we should consider, right?
Judge GORSUCH: I said that the Supreme Court of the United States in NAACP recognized that
the First Amendment protections we all as people in this country enjoy . . . [c]an be chilled sometimes. . . . It is a First Amendment right we are talking about, Senator.
Senator WHITEHOUSE: And where does anonymity—let us say $1 billion in anonymous funding
into our elections, where does that fit . . . into the values that you bring to this?
Judge GORSUCH: In the first instance, Senator, it is for this body to legislate . . . then it would
come to court, and the record will be made.
Senator WHITEHOUSE: Of course, Citizens United did actually overrule a law that we had written,
so that is hardly the be all and the end all.
Id. at 137–38. Justice Gorsuch is referring to NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
209
See Peter Overby, On Appeals Court, Kavanaugh Helped to Loosen Political Money Laws, NPR
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/08/636299187/on-appeals-court-kavanaugh-helped-to-loosenpolitical-money-laws.
210
For a good summary of then-Judge Kavanaugh’s prior opinions, see id.
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on disclosure is less clear. We know less about the campaign finance opinions
of Justice Ginsburg’s replacement, Justice Barrett. However, she clerked for
Justice Scalia and has said that “his judicial philosophy is mine.”211 Whether that
extends to his strong support for campaign finance disclosure is yet to be seen.
B. For Campaigns
The research cited in Part II suggests that campaigns and so-called “outside
groups” stand to gain from four approaches to campaign finance disclosure.
First, they should point out when the opposing side has violated campaign
finance laws; in my research, the biggest impact on voter choice and vote share
is when campaign finance violations are revealed. Second, campaigns should
publicize when their opponents are supported by dark money groups. To benefit
from the—more modest—benefits of overcompliance, campaigns should also
request that groups who want to support their side must disclose information
about their donors. Where possible, campaigns should over-comply with
disclosure requirements where they can meaningfully inform voters about their
sources of support, and brag publicly about having done so. Consider, for
example, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s insistence on disclosing her bundlers and
urging other candidates to do the same.212 Finally, campaigns should undergo
voluntary audits in the absence of a government audit program, to provide
backing for their claims of running a clean campaign.213 These steps will be
especially helpful in elections in which party is not an available heuristic, like
party primaries or nonpartisan elections.
C. For Policymakers
Campaign finance disclosure is popular, and most voters say they seek the
information at least some of the time.214 Moreover, despite the fact that
disclosure is becoming a polarizing issue among political elites, disclosure is not

211
Marica Coyle, ‘His Judicial Philosophy Is Mine’: Amy Barrett Touts Scalia in Remarks from Rose
Garden, LAW.COM (Sept. 26, 2020, 5:27 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/09/26/his-judicialphilosophy-is-mine-amy-barrett-touts-scalia-in-remarks-from-rose-garden/.
212
Gregory Krieg & MJ Lee, Elizabeth Warren Wants 2020 Rivals to Name Big Donors with Influential
Campaign Positions, CNN (Oct. 15, 2019, 11:17 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/15/politics/elizabethwarren-campaign-finance-donor-disclosure/index.html.
213
Groups may have good reasons to organize as a 501(c)(4) rather than a 527, PAC, or SuperPAC. The
501(c)(4) groups can conduct any “social welfare” activity, and in some years, they may not engage in political
campaigning at all. See Social Welfare Organizations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-nonprofits/social-welfare-organizations (last visited May 26, 2021). The other organizational forms are campaign
focused.
214
See Wood, supra note 6.
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a particularly partisan issue for voters.215 Lawmakers looking to score points
with their constituents could do so by introducing more disclosure into the
existing framework.
In designing an optimal framework, policymakers must consider the two
types of information communicated through campaign finance disclosure
regulations. Mandatory disclosure increases the information about the policies
that candidates will favor once in office.216 But where policymakers leave room
for voluntary disclosure, the results from the studies described here suggest that
voters learn about transparency and trustworthiness of candidates and the groups
that support them.
If reformers err too much on the side of voluntary disclosure, voters may
receive a suboptimal amount of information about policy. A purely voluntary
disclosure regime will under-provide campaign finance information because
many dark money groups will continue to choose not to disclose. If reformers
instead err too much on the side of mandatory disclosure, voters will miss out
on information about trustworthiness and transparency that comes when
candidates and groups voluntarily disclose more than the law requires. For the
rest of this section, I explain how regulatory choices affect policy and non-policy
information available to voters.
1. Campaign Finance Regulatory Choices That Affect Policy Information
Arguments for changing our disclosure regime in ways that maximize voter
policy information have centered on disclosure thresholds, the type of donor
information collected and disclosed, forcing mandatory disclosure on 501(c)(4)
groups, and online advertising. The tradeoffs faced by policymakers for each of
these four areas of disclosure are worth a brief discussion.
a. Modifying Disclosure Thresholds
Disclosure thresholds vary across jurisdictions.217 Some states require
disclosure of all contributions, and others have thresholds higher than the
threshold for federal candidates ($200).218 Some lawyers and scholars argue that
disclosure thresholds should be raised,219 meaning that more campaign financing
215

Id. at 14.
Bonica, supra note 74, at 373–76.
217
Disclosure and Reporting Requirements, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2015),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/disclosure-and-reporting-requirements.aspx.
218
Id.
219
Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8, 2010),
216
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would be subject only to voluntary disclosure. In a post-McCutcheon world in
which individuals can give over $300,000 to “joint victory funds”220 and
unlimited amounts to SuperPACs,221 the identity of donors of $200 probably
does not add much information to voters’ information about policies the
candidate is likely to pursue once in office. This is particularly true in expensive
federal elections. Raising the threshold would also allow more “space” for
candidates to voluntarily disclose.
Voluntary disclosure of small donors might not have salutary benefits for
voters’ perceptions of the transparency or trustworthiness of a candidate.222
Suppose reformers raised the threshold modestly, say to $500. Voters may not
reward voluntary disclosure of donors between some smaller amount and the
new threshold. Relatively speaking, $500 is still not much money in our world
of big-money politics. Suppose now that policymakers raise mandatory
disclosure thresholds by a lot, say, to the federal contribution limit of $2,700.
Candidates and groups choosing to disclose fairly large donors, such as all
donors above $1,000 or $2,000, might reap transparency and trustworthiness
benefits. The extent to which we would lose precision in our estimates of
candidate policies is currently not known, but it is knowable using Bonica’s
data.223 Future researchers—and the campaigns themselves—can estimate
where the valence benefits kick in. In general, a modest raise of disclosure
thresholds would not do much to affect the mix of information available to the
voters, but a larger change in disclosure thresholds could.

http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/shade-from-the-glare-the-case-for-semi-disclosure/;
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures about Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 280–82 (2010); Richard Briffault,
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 300 (2010).
220
See Bob Biersack, How Wealthy Donors Fund the National Party by Giving to the States,
OPENSECRETS (July 24, 2017, 6:38 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/07/wealthy-donors-fundnational-party-giving-to-state.s/.
221
Contributions to Super PACs and Hybrid PACs, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-andcommittees/taking-receipts-pac/contributions-to-super-pacs-and-hybrid-pacs/ (last visited May 26, 2021).
222
Contributors may feel “protected” from disclosure when they give below a mandatory threshold, and
they may feel unfairly “exposed” if the candidate or group discloses their identity when the law does not require
it. This happens more often than one might expect: in state-level races between 2000 and 2008, 17% of all
contributions that candidates and campaigns reported were below the state’s mandatory threshold. Giving below
the threshold is not a safe harbor from being identified. Abby K. Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows
of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns, 15 ELECTION L.J. 302, 305 n.20 (2016).
And now, with the advent of online donation vehicles like ActBlue, donors may not realize that they are giving
to a conduit, which must disclose every contribution, no matter how small. See Alvarez et al., supra note 15, at
1, 4.
223
See Bonica, supra note 74.
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b. Expand the Types of Spenders Subject to Disclosure to Solve the
“Dark Money” Problem
What are the informational tradeoffs faced by policymakers considering
mandatory disclosure for 501(c) groups and LLCs? In federal campaigns,
disclosure by these groups is currently entirely voluntary as long as they are not
running political ads thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general
election and where the contribution is earmarked for particular ads—a
requirement that is easy to circumvent.224 As the studies presented here show,
respondents reward disclosure where it is not legally required. Respondents
evaluated the candidates supported by voluntarily disclosing groups as more
trustworthy. Most politically active 501(c)(4) groups and LLCs do not
voluntarily disclose their donors.225
If policymakers were to require disclosure of at least some donors (especially
large donors) from these non-disclosing groups, voters would gain policyrelevant information. While the political leanings of the biggest dark money
groups are already strongly identified with policy positions or ideologies, such
as the NRA-Institute for Legislative Action and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
other groups have names that are not easily identified with a particular ideology
or policy platform.226 Consider “American Action Network,” “One Nation,” and
“iAmerica Action,” all of whom spent millions in the 2016 elections, and whose
names do not indicate their political leanings.227
If disclosure rules change, anonymity-seeking donors might still find
nondisclosure due to the nature of 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) organizations. The
organizations can engage in social welfare and policy work outside of election
season.228 Requiring mandatory disclosure of the donors whose money goes to
support campaign-related activities can therefore incentivize 501(c)(4) groups
to segregate their donors into “disclosable” and “non-disclosable” donors.
Money from non-disclosable donors could go to overhead or social welfare
224

52 U.S.C. § 30104.
Dark Money Basics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics (last visited May
26, 2021).
226
See Broockman et al., supra note 98; Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 77.
227
See American Action Network, ISSUE ONE, https://www.issueone.org/dark-money-groups-americanaction-network/ (last visited June 18, 2021); One Nation, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/politicalaction-committees-pacs/C90016262/expenditures/2016 (last visited June 18, 2021); iAmerica Action,
OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/iamerica-action/C90016288/
summary/2016 (last visited June 18, 2021).
228
That is why Our Revolution organized as a 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization, rather than a PAC, in the
first place. See Eliza Newlin Carney, Nonprofit Structure Backfires on ‘Our Revolution’, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 1,
2016), https://prospect.org/power/nonprofit-structure-backfires-our-revolution/.
225
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improving activities that are not campaign related. Money from disclosable
donors could go to campaign-related activities. The donation form can simply
ask contributors whether they are comfortable with their donation being made
public. Corporations, or people giving to support a policy that is incongruent
with their public persona, in particular, might opt for “non-disclosable” status.229
In sum, the hydraulics of campaign finance means that forcing mandatory
disclosure on these “dark money” groups might result in incomplete donor
information because donors who seek anonymity can still have it. The donor
information that is revealed is likely to be the least “objectionable” set of donors,
from a public opinion perspective—perhaps from the most politically moderate
subset of the organization’s donors. Putting aside the ban on coordination
between candidates and groups, partial disclosure would provide a biased
estimate of the policy pressures on the candidate as a result of expenditures made
by the group. However, information leading to biased estimates is better than no
information, particularly because researchers can often correct for bias.
The policy information gained by increased disclosure must be weighed
against the trustworthiness benefits lost by mandating disclosure. The amount of
transparency information we would sacrifice with more disclosure depends on
where the mandatory threshold is set. If policymakers require disclosure of only
large donations, say above $10,000, disclosure-friendly groups could continue
to voluntarily disclose below the threshold, and voters and the voluntarily
disclosing groups would benefit accordingly.230
c. Modifying the Type of Donor Information That Is Collected or
Disclosed
Policymakers may consider changing the donor information gathered and
reported by candidates to optimize the informational tradeoffs. The FEC
currently releases contributor name, city, state, zip code, principal place of
229

See Oklobdzija, supra note 78.
Policymakers can also force disclosure on all types of spending by closing the main regulatory gap:
online advertising. There are two ways in which online advertising lacks disclaimers. First, the small ads that
appear next to search results or on Facebook page are exempt from federal disclaimer requirements under the
“small items” exemption for ads so small that including a disclaimer on them is impractical. See Advertising and
Disclaimers, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/advertising-and-disclaimers/ (last
visited May 26, 2021). Second, the FEC exempts from disclaimers any advertising placed “for a fee on another’s
website”. Id. This second exemption turns political communication on the Internet into the “wild west.”
Nathaniel Persily, Facebook May Soon Have More Power over Elections Than the FEC. Are We Ready?, WASH.
POST (Aug. 10, 2016), http://wapo.st/2b3yWuH. For more information on ways to fix these gaps, see Wood &
Ravel, supra note 3, at 1248–53, and Abby K. Wood, Facilitating Accountability for Online Political
Advertisements, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 520 (2020).
230
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business, occupation, date of each contribution, and amount contributed each
time.231 All of this information can be informative with regard to the policies
that a donor might support.
For example, a contributor’s geographic information may predict the
policies that the candidate’s supporters favor. Consider two hypothetical
California contributors. A contributor from Los Angeles and a contributor from
San Diego, despite living only 120 miles apart, probably have different policy
concerns. The Angeleno lives in a city culturally dominated by the entertainment
industry but also deeply involved in international trade and petroleum.232 The
San Diego donor, on the other hand, lives on the Mexican border near several
U.S. military installations.233 Zip codes within large cities like these can help
voters to refine their estimates of donor policy preferences even more closely.
The geographic location of a donor can help voters know more about the policy
pressures a candidate will face.
Donors and voters alike want to protect their economic interests, which
include their jobs. Disclosing the sector in which a donor is employed is useful
for predicting future policy responsiveness of an elected official supported by
donors from that sector.234 Similarly, a donor’s general occupation is useful for
predicting a candidate’s preferred policies. Consider the healthcare sector.
Within the sector, or even within one hospital, if nurses support a candidate but
hospital management does not, voters can learn about pressures the candidate
may face with regard to labor issues.235

231
Individual Contributions, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/introduction-campaign-finance/how-to-researchpublic-records/individual-contributions/ (last visited May 26, 2021).
232
L.A. CNTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY AND THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY
ECONOMY 1–3 (2012), https://laedc.org/2012/11/01/entertainment-industry-los-angeles-county-economy/;
Global Trade and Foreign Investment, L.A. AREA CHAMBER COM., https://lachamber.com/issues/level1/globaltrade-and-foreign-investment/ (last visited May 26, 2021); A History of Neighborhood Drilling, STAND-L.A.,
https://www.stand.la/history-of-oil-in-los-angeles.html (last visited May 26, 2021).
233
Military Information, SAN DIEGO, https://www.sandiego.org/articles/military/military-information.
aspx (last visited May 26, 2021).
234
Of course, there are corruption-based reasons for wanting to know the more granular information of
the employer, so that the public can hold elected officials accountable for working to benefit donors versus nondonors.
235
Where workers donate is not straightforward, as Alexander Hertel-Fernandez’s work shows. In general,
employer political pressure stops short of suggesting where workers should send their money, but some of the
workers and employers he surveyed reported it happening. See ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, POLITICS AT
WORK: HOW COMPANIES TURN THEIR WORKERS INTO LOBBYISTS (2018). Of course, revealing employer
information can actually help the government detect instances in which employers pressure employees to make
political contributions. Too many contributions in too short of a time period from one company might be
indicative that something fishy is going on.
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Similarly, the date of the contribution provides useful information, insofar
as it can help voters—and campaigns—understand which policy speeches and
news stories contributors are reacting to. Famously, the Obama campaign raised
$10 million in the 24 hours following Sarah Palin’s speech at the 2008
Republican National Convention.236 Her speech included policy mentions of
energy, state budget surpluses, taxes, and manufacturing. Policy information in
the campaign is revealed not only by geography and sector, but also over time.237
For any one individual donation, public disclosure of the donor’s name is
probably the least informative piece of information available to voters. However,
name is probably the most important piece of donor information for predicting
the ideologies and roll call votes of candidates across time. Donor name is the
main piece of information that can reliably link contributions over time. Donor
ideology can be estimated with some precision, as Bonica’s work has shown.238
The same effect could be achieved by replacing the donor’s name with a donor
ID number, so that the donor’s name does not become public.239 That said, there
is probably a threshold above which a contributor plays such an outsized role in
a campaign or group expenditure that voters need to know the identity of the
contributor. Changing a name like “Charles Koch” or “George Soros” to an ID
number would represent a real loss of information about policy pressures on and
preferences of candidates.
Should policymakers make any of this disclosure voluntary, rather than
mandatory? The two most sensitive items disclosed are contributor name and
place of employment or occupation. Replacing name with an ID number would
still allow the ideology-predicting benefits of linked donations over time, so that
experts could still provide estimates of candidate ideology. There could be some
informational losses to people searching the contributions of respected friends,
neighbors, or leaders, in making their voting decisions, but to my knowledge
these losses have not been studied. On net, the informational losses about
candidate policy pressures that would result from replacing names with ID
numbers seem small, at least below a certain “mega donor” threshold. In an ID
number disclosure regime, candidates might be able to gain valence benefits by
voluntarily disclosing the names of donors below a certain (very high) threshold,
especially in states with no contribution limits.
236
Matthew Mosk, Obama Raises Record $10 Million Since Palin Speech, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2008,
5:15 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/09/obama-raised-8-million-since-p.html.
237
The biggest beneficiary of such information is probably the candidate, as Elmendorf and I argue. See
Elmendorf & Wood, supra note 75.
238
See supra notes 72–74 (referring to the (policy) informational benefit).
239
See Elmendorf & Wood, supra note 75.
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The public disclosure of place of employment and occupation provides
voters with policy information for the reasons described above. Were these data
no longer required, voters might appreciate seeing them, especially in the
aggregate, for example, the amounts contributed by employees of certain
industries. Such voluntary disclosure could promote perceptions of
trustworthiness and transparency.
Policymakers might also choose to continue to require the information but
break the link between the employment and occupation information and the
identity of the individual making the contribution when posting it online.
Breaking this link would only marginally reduce voter information about
policy—it rarely matters that Person X in Job Y in Company Z donated. It might
matter that Person X gave, especially if the person is a mega donor, and it does
matter that people doing Job Y support the candidate and that people at Company
Z are contributing.
2. Campaign Finance Regulatory Choices That Affect Non-policy
Information
The overcompliance described and rewarded in the studies above was based
on voluntary disclosure. These effects can occur without further action on the
part of lawmakers and regulators. Respondents in the studies discussed above
reacted in dramatic fashion to candidates’ failure to comply. Detecting such
failures requires audits. Audits happen after the campaign; dark money
disclosure and, short of that, disclosure disclaimers can also help inform voters.
a. Adopting Disclosure Disclaimers
Where political support for demanding mandatory dark money disclosure is
lacking, disclosure disclaimers provide a middle ground. The dark money
treatments in the experiments presented above provided “disclaimers about
disclosures,” as they made clear to would-be voters when candidates received
support from non-disclosing groups. Even if voters do not learn the identity of
big money donors to outside groups, knowing that outside groups supporting the
candidate do not disclose their donors helps voters use policy and non-policy
information to make their ballot choices. Therefore, one option for improving
information is to require a disclaimer at the end of an ad funded by nondisclosing organizations, saying that the message is provided by a group that
does not disclose its donors.

WOOD_6.22.21

2021]

6/22/2021 10:01 AM

LEARNING FROM CAMPAIGN FINANCE INFORMATION

1137

Candidates are legally prohibited from coordinating with outside groups.240
They cannot prevent outside groups from forming. Moreover, it seems that some
outside groups that sprout up spend the vast majority of the money they take in
on salaries and consultants, and only a very small percentage—as low as 10%—
actually supporting candidates and issues.241 So it might seem unfair to the
candidates to include a disclaimer about anonymity at the end of ads the
candidate has no control over now that we know voters react to that information
by punishing the candidate, like they did with Johnson in the experimental
vignette. Yet nothing is stopping candidates from campaigning against outside
groups and insisting publicly that donors do not fund outside groups who claim
to support the candidate. Indeed, Donald Trump did just that in January 2016.242
Campaigning against outside groups while accepting audits might be the best of
both worlds for candidates, helping them to maximize voters’ perceptions of
their trustworthiness and ability to comply with campaign finance rules.
As commonly happens in the world of electoral reform, enterprising state
governments have led the way, under the assumption that voters will use
information about disclosure to form opinions about candidates and issues. For
example, the State of Montana requires disclaimers about non-disclosure of
funding sources.243 Montana requires that groups who do not disclose their
donors “clearly and conspicuously include in all communications advocating the
success or defeat of a candidate . . . the following disclaimer ‘This
communication is funded by anonymous sources. The voter should determine
the veracity of its content.’”244
240

11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20–109.21 (2006).
Paul H. Jossey, How We Killed the Tea Party, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2016), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2016/08/tea-party-pacs-ideas-death-214164.
242
Maggie Haberman, PAC Is Backing Donald Trump, Despite Campaign’s Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12,
2016, 2:44 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/02/ 12/pac-is-backing-donald-trump-despitecampaigns-policy/ (“Last year, it emerged that a super PAC using the same name as his campaign slogan—
Make America Great Again—had ties to officials on his campaign. The person running that group, a Republican
operative from Colorado named Mike Ciletti, has a company that has been used by the campaign over the last
year for things like bumper stickers. When questions were raised about overlap between the two groups, Mr.
Trump’s campaign urged that group and a crop of other super PACs hoping to support him to shut down. Mr.
Ciletti complied.”).
242
See Gerken et al., supra note 143.
243
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-237 (2016).
244
Id. The full statute states: “If a political committee claims to be exempt from disclosing the name of a
person making a contribution to the political committee, the committee shall clearly and conspicuously include
in all communications advocating the success or defeat of a candidate, political party, or ballot issue through
any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, direct mailing, poster, handbill,
bumper sticker, internet website, or other form of general political advertising or issue advocacy the following
disclaimer: ‘This communication is funded by anonymous sources. The voter should determine the veracity of
its content.’” Id.
241
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b. Mandatory or Voluntary Audits
Mandatory disclosure requirements establish a floor for the amount of
information that candidates are required to reveal. Audits can lend credibility to
the mandatory disclosures and verify that the candidate did not under-disclose
(or over-disclose), revealing candidate attributes and providing more
information to voters. Since voters reward campaign finance transparency,
candidates who want to capitalize on transparency’s advantages should welcome
voluntary audits. Opting in to an audit sends a signal to voters that the candidate
has nothing to hide. Voters can infer that candidates who are willing to undergo
an audit are earnestly trying to comply with campaign finance laws and are more
willing to subject themselves to public scrutiny than candidates who opt out of
a voluntary audit. In other words, voters can infer that they are a “clean” type.
Of course, if the candidate has sloppy bookkeeping or has violated campaign
finance regulations, then the candidate should avoid audits, because voters will
punish a “dirty” audit more than they reward a clean one.
We would expect to see candidates opt in to voluntary audits of their
campaign finances any time that the electoral and favorability benefits are worth
the expense and inconvenience. For example, we might observe a candidate opt
in to a voluntary audit when the race is tight. During primary season, candidates
may elect to opt in to the audit to distinguish themselves and boost voters’
impressions of how much they will embrace transparency in office. In the wake
of a scandal affecting the candidate or a member of her party, a candidate might
opt to undergo an audit to show her “clean hands” or remind voters that she is
transparent.
Given my findings, we should not need government action for a voluntary
audit program to emerge. If clean types stand to gain from voluntary audits, why
have we not already seen them emerge? One reason could be that candidates do
not know that voters are willing to reward transparency. Another might be that
incumbents have a fundraising advantage and would therefore be less
inconvenienced by dedicating resources to an audit, but because incumbent
advantage is so large, the additional electoral help that a clean audit could
provide is simply not needed.245 This is particularly true for incumbents who do
not face primary opponents.
If voluntary audits are good, are mandatory audits better? Mandatory audits
would provide the information that voluntary audits provide without requiring
245
See Alexander Fouirnaies & Andrew B. Hall, The Financial Incumbency Advantage: Causes and
Consequences, 76 J. POL. 711, 711 (2014) (summarizing literature on incumbency advantage).
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an adverse inference by the voters against candidates who do not undergo a
voluntary audit. But, pragmatically, mandatory audits would be a tough sell to
elected officials. Mandatory audits are part of some public funding programs,
like the New York City campaign finance program, and agreeing to the audits is
a condition to receiving public money in these programs.246 But in the absence
of public funding, legislators have shown themselves to be resistant to
mandatory audits, even when conducted at random. After the FEC’s random
audits in 1977, Congress reduced the budget for the random audit program to
zero dollars.247 Members of Congress did not enjoy being at risk of an audit.248
Legislators’ reticence to submit their campaigns to random audits may deprive
the public of other benefits. If random audit programs work via reputation-based
signaling to force would-be non-compliers into compliance or out of the
election, then two results should follow. First, our campaign financing will be
cleaner than it would be in the absence of the audits, leaving elected officials
less vulnerable to untraceable influences.249 Second, on average, candidates will
be perceived as more trustworthy, which can, in turn, lend legitimacy to
government.250
Campaign finance regulations force campaigns to dedicate resources to
compliance, rather than campaigning. Mandatory audits would add another cost
to campaigning, raising the barrier to entry for challengers, who are generally
less well-networked than incumbents. The correct balance between adding
additional barriers to entry for challengers and increasing valuable information
to the public is not obvious. Voluntary audits will result in more credible
disclosure information reaching voters and will allow clean candidates to signal
their cleanliness if they are willing to undergo the cost of the audit, without
erecting more barriers to entry.251
246
Introduction, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., https://www.nyccfb.info/candidate-services/consultant-andvendor-guide/introduction/ (last visited May 26, 2021).
247
R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44319, THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ENFORCEMENT
PROCESS AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15 n.61 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44319.pdf; see
Wood & Grose, supra note 132.
248
See Wood & Grose, supra note 132.
249
Id. at 5–6. Of course, campaign audits of disclosable contributions and expenditures while a “dark
money” regime persists means that untraceable influences can persist, and indeed, the amount of dark money in
the system may increase if audits and dark money exist at the same time. To avoid this possibility, audits of the
entities making the “dark money” expenditures may need to be paired with campaign audits.
250
Sofie Marien & Marc Hooghe, Does Political Trust Matter? An Empirical Investigation into the
Relation Between Political Trust and Support for Law Compliance, 50 EUR. J. POL. RSCH. 267, 270 (2010)
(“[E]mpirical evidence shows that citizens are more likely to follow the decisions of authorities if they perceive
these authorities to be trustworthy and legitimate.”).
251
A middle ground, and a potentially less expensive mandatory option, might be for the campaign finance
regulator to require that all campaigns have a certified public accountant on record who signs off on their
campaign finance disclosures, at least once contributions and expenditures reach a certain level. The current
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If the incentives are such that audits can be voluntary, should disclosure be
voluntary, too? No. The credibility-enhancing features of the audit can only exist
if disclosures are mandated. Otherwise, audits could be conducted on incomplete
information, and a candidate could be said to have a “clean” audit, even though
she hid many illegal or excessive contributions that violated campaign finance
law.
Institutional details of audits matter, and I consider some of them here. For
example, audits’ credibility and type-revealing benefits increase with the
amount of access the auditor has.252 To my knowledge, no study has tested the
stringency of auditing required for the benefits to kick in. It might be the case
that candidates need not be too inconvenienced by audits to reap their benefits.
The question remains open to future research.
For the audits to be useful, audit reports should be comparable across
candidates, allowing voters to compare apples to apples. This does not
necessarily require government involvement. Think of it like a certification.
Other industries have managed to create voluntary certification programs
without the government.253 Of course, there are government-run certification
modus operandi for many candidates is to operate campaign finances (sometimes literally) from a shoebox, and
to hire lawyers if they are audited. John O’Connor, 50 Years Later, Illinois’ ‘Shoebox Scandal’ Still Amazes, AP
NEWS (Oct. 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/political-corruption-springfield-illinois-67b7c692a1858beac
0b6d4524a84b527. A rule like this would probably decrease violations across the board, and campaign finance
compliance would be less informative as to candidate type. Existing research indicates that campaigning has a
“disciplining” and professionalizing effect on candidates, so including a CPA on the campaign staff would
probably further discipline and professionalize candidates and campaigns. It may also weed out fraudulent or
corrupt types, improving our governance by improving the candidate pool. The rule would need to be sensitive
to potential deterrent effects on marginal challengers afraid of the costs of campaigning. Setting the CPA
requirement monetary thresholds at 40%, for example, of campaign expenditures for the prior victor could help
reduce deterrence, allowing candidates to test the waters before they take on accounting expenses. Similarly,
delaying the requirement until the last quarter of the campaign for smaller or more localized campaigns would
reduce the deterrent effect.
252
See Nemit Shroff, Credible Financial Statements Help Firms Raise Financing and Increase
Investment, CLS BLUE SKY (Nov. 13, 2015), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/11/13/crediblefinancial-statements-help-firms-raise-financing-and-increase-investment/.
253
Consider the U.S. Green Building Council, which provides the LEED rating system. “LEED” stands
for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, and buildings that are LEED certified can credibly boast
of energy and water efficiency, use of safe and sustainable materials, and other attractive qualities. LEED Rating
System, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/leed (last visited May 26, 2021). To obtain LEED
certification, an interested party simply contacts the U.S. Green Building Council, invites the inspectors in, pays
fees, and receives the certification. See generally U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, usgbc.org (last visited May 26,
2021). Other markets use similar private certification models, like the markets for sustainable wood and for
rainforest-protecting coffee. See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-us (last visited May 26,
2020); Rainforest Alliance Certified Coffee, RAINFOREST ALL. (Sept. 24, 2016), http://www.rainforest-alliance.
org/articles/rainforest-alliance-certified-coffee. Examples are legion and not all involve certifications. See, for
example, The Federal Communications Commission’s program for “self-audits” and “self-reports” for stations.
See Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMMC’NS. L.J. 771 (1999).
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programs as well, like USDA’s “organic” certification for produce, and the
Energy Star certification for appliances, created jointly by the EPA and the
Department of Energy.254 These agencies create the standards and require that a
party seeking certification bring in an inspector from an approved list to ensure
that the standards are met. In the campaign finance context, maintaining a list of
approved auditors would require very little regulatory effort.
Either the private or hands-off public approach could work in the campaign
finance context, though if a private group were to create the system, the group
would need to have credibility on both sides of the aisle to be useful in general
elections. Even in a hyperpartisan age, these groups still exist.255
States are innovating with new campaign finance models regularly. For
states that embrace campaign finance reform, an audit program could be created
by the legislature, which could enable the regulator itself to conduct audits upon
request. The legislature would have to fund enough auditors to carry out the
requested audits.256 Under that model, the only cost to candidates is the cost of
scheduling and undergoing the audit, but not paying the auditors. As the postWatergate random audit program at the FEC shows, political will to continue
publicly funding the audits might deteriorate rather quickly.257
CONCLUSION
Campaigns are regulated entities. Many regulated entities are subject to
disclosure and audits. In the campaign finance context, the willingness of the
Court to uphold campaign finance disclosure requirements turns on its

254
See What Is Energy Star, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/about (last visited May 26, 2021);
Organic Regulations, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/organic (last visited May 26, 2021).
255
The most obvious existing campaign finance groups to inform, if not take on, this project are the Center
for Responsive Politics (opensecrets.org) for federal races and National Institute for Money in Politics (followthemoney.org) for state races, though it would be impossible for any one group to provide voluntary audits
for all state races. (Note: the author is on the board of directors of the National Institute for Money in Politics.)
256
FEC enforcement procedures are onerous, and enforcement is fairly unpopular with half of the commissioners, as evidenced by the number of split votes on enforcement actions over the past decade or more. See
ANN M. RAVEL, DYSFUNCTION AND DEADLOCK: THE ENFORCEMENT CRISIS AT THE FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION REVEALS THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF DRAINING THE SWAMP 3 (2017), https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/ann-m-ravel/; Ann M. Ravel, Dysfunction and Deadlock at the Federal Election Commission, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/dysfunction-and-deadlock-atthe-federal-election-commission.html. Therefore, as long as the FEC remains split, actual enforcement would
not be a real threat. The point here is to reap the benefits of transparency, not to aid enforcement.
257
Lauren Eber, Note, Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEC Reform, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155,
1168 (2006).
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understanding of the informational benefit. I argue here that the Court’s current
policy-prediction-only conception is unnecessarily limited.
Disclosure aids voter competence in more ways than existing models
assume, and the information provided in disclosure disclaimers and campaign
finance audits can help meet the government’s interest in improving voter
competence. The Court should continue to uphold well-tailored disclosure
requirements because the governmental interest in campaign finance
transparency is even stronger than the Court has acknowledged.
The studies presented above do not interrogate the content of campaign
finance law. Instead, they suggest that the current framework short sells the
informational benefit of campaign finance disclosure, and that voters punish
dark money and reward transparency. Future research can better establish which
types of information, and which disclosure thresholds, help to maximize the
benefits of campaign finance disclosure while minimizing the risks to
contributors. If laws are too lax, over-complying is easy. If they are too stringent,
over-complying is difficult. So, this experiment bears repeating under different
disclosure regimes.

